State v. Bohannon8/21/2003
, by its plain language, makes no distinction between proceedings in the district or circuit courts -- requires that a final and appealable judgment or order in criminal cases be in written form. See State v. Ho, 7 Haw. App. 516, 518-19, 782 P.2d 29, 31 (1989) (construing HRAP Rule 4(b) (1985)), overruled on other grounds in State v. Hoey, 77 Hawaii 17, 30, 881 P.2d 504, 516 (1994).
The State is authorized to appeal from a pre-trial order granting a motion to suppress evidence by HRS § 641-13(7) (Supp. 1988). In State v. Johnson, 50 Haw. 525, 445 P.2d 36 (1968), the supreme court held that Revised Laws of Hawaii (RLH) 1955 § 212-2, which is now § 641-13, must be strictly construed. . . . We hold that the same rule of strict construction applies to the Rule 4(b) HRAP requirement that the State must file its notice of appeal within 30 days of the entry of the judgment or order appealed from. The State can only appeal from a written order or judgment filed with the clerk. Absent a written order of suppression, the State's notice of appeal in this case did not give rise to appellate jurisdiction. [Citation omitted.]
Id. (footnote and citation omitted) (emphasis added).
By contrast, HRPP Rule 44(b)(1), which, as mentioned supra in note 9, was in effect at the time the district court announced its oral order denying the prosecution's motion for reconsideration, provides in relevant part that " he notation of the decision or ruling on the calendar shall constitute the order and the entry thereof." HRPP Rule 44(b)(1) prescribes the procedure by which an order becomes final in the district courts; the order, however, does not become appealable until a separate written order has been filed with the clerk of the court in accordance with HRAP Rule 4(b)(3). Accordingly, we hold that, in order to appeal a criminal matter in the district court, the appealing party must appeal from a written judgment or order that has been filed with the clerk of the court pursuant to HRAP Rule 4(b)(3).
2. The Prosecution Filed A Timely Notice Of Appeal, Pursuant To HRAP Rule 4(b).
It is well settled that "the right of appeal in a criminal case is purely statutory and exists only when given by some constitutional or statutory provision." State v. Oshiro, 69 Haw. 438, 441, 746 P.2d 568, 570 (1987). HRS § 641-13 (1993) enumerates the "instances" in which the prosecution may appeal a criminal case from the district and circuit courts, including, inter alia, appeals from "an order . . . sustaining a motion to dismiss," see HRS § 641-13(1), appeals from "an order . . . dismissing the case where the defendant has not been put in jeopardy," see HRS § 641-13(2), and appeals from "a pretrial order granting a motion for the suppression of evidence," see HRS § 641-13(7). Inasmuch as the district court granted Bohannon's motions to suppress and to dismiss, the prosecution had the statutory right to appeal the district court's disposition.
With respect to the timeliness of the prosecution's notice of appeal, HRAP Rule 4(b)(1), see supra note 1, which sets forth the "time and place of filing" a notice of appeal, prescribes that "the notice of appeal shall be filed in the . . . district . . . court within 30 days after the entry of the judgment or order appealed from." HRAP Rule (4)(b)(3), see supra note 1, further provides that " judgment or order is entered within the meaning of [HRAP Rule 4(b)(1)] when it is filed with the clerk of the court." In the present matter, the record reflects that the prosecution filed its notice of appeal on February 15, 2001. We need not reach the question whether the January 22, 2001 written order denying the prosecution's motion for reconsideration, on th
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