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State v. Bohannon8/21/2003
e one hand, or the January 31, 2001 written order granting Bohannon's motions to suppress and to dismiss, on the other, triggered the thirty-day appeal period prescribed by HRAP Rule 4(b)(1), because the prosecution's notice of appeal was filed well within thirty days of both of the written orders. Accordingly, the prosecution's notice of appeal was timely, and this court has jurisdiction to address the merits of its appeal.
B. HPD Officer Kashimoto Had Reasonable Suspicion To Stop Bohannon, And, Thus, The District Court Erred In Granting Bohannon's Motions To Suppress And To Dismiss.
The prosecution argues that Officer Kashimoto's testimony at the hearing on Bohannon's motion to suppress established the "specific and articulable facts" to support his belief that Bohannon was operating her vehicle in an unsafe and imprudent manner. The prosecution asserts that the district court erred in relying on " he screeching of tires alone" in its determination that there was no reasonable suspicion to justify Officer Kashimoto's investigative stop, because Officer Kashimoto made several other observations, which, under the totality of the circumstances, established reasonable suspicion to stop Bohannon. Specifically, the prosecution contends that, in addition to the two seconds of screeching tires, Officer Kashimoto observed that (1) Bohannon's vehicle was required to come to a "screeching halt" in order to avoid colliding with the officer's Cushman, (2) Bohannon had nearly rear-ended Officer Kashimoto's Cushman by coming to a complete stop within only two feet of it, (3) the distance between Officer Kashimoto's Cushman and Bohannon's vehicle was so small that Officer Kashimoto was unable to see Bohannon's headlights, and (4) as described supra in section I, Bohannon's "screeching halt" had caused Officer Kashimoto "to release his brake to move his vehicle forward" in order to "maintain sufficient distance." Based on the foregoing observations, the prosecution maintains that "Officer Kashimoto's concern for at least his own safety prior to his stop of [Bohannon's] car was objectively reasonable," thereby justifying stopping Bohannon to investigate the situation.
Bohannon responds that the district court correctly granted her motion to suppress, because the prosecution had failed to meet its burden of overcoming the presumption of an unreasonable seizure by establishing that Officer Kashimoto's investigative stop fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Bohannon contends that the prosecution "did not claim that the 'specific facts' gave rise to reasonable suspicion that [Bohannon] was engaged in any criminal law or traffic violation" and that Officer Kashimoto conceded at Bohannon's motion to suppress hearing "that the screeching of brakes was not against the law." In our view, Officer Kashimoto had reasonable suspicion to stop Bohannon.
"A stop of a vehicle for an investigatory purpose constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures[,]" as guaranteed by the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Hawaii Constitution. State v. Bolosan, 78 Hawaii 86, 92, 890 P.2d 673, 679 (1995).
In determining the reasonableness of wholly discretionary automobile stops, this court has repeatedly applied the standard set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). [Citations omitted.] Guided by Terry, we stated in State v. Barnes[, 58 Haw. 333, 568 P.2d 1207 (1977)]:
To justify an investigative stop, short of arrest based on probable cause, "the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken toge
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