People v. Robinson9/24/2003
ue at this stage, and the trial court's determination is subject to de novo review." Morris, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 76, citing Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d at 385. "If the petition is not dismissed and survives the first stage of the post-conviction process then subsection (b) of section 122-2.1 of the Act provides that 'the court shall order the petition to be docketed for further consideration in accordance with Sections 122-4 through 122-6.'" Morris, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 76, quoting 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(b) (West 1998). "At the second stage of the post-conviction process, the State is required to either answer the pleading or move to dismiss." Morris, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 76, citing 725 ILCS 5/122-5 (West 1998). "If at the second stage a substantial showing of a constitutional violation is established, the petition is advanced to the third stage for an evidentiary hearing." Morris, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 76, citing 725 ILCS 5/122-6 (West 1998); Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d at 418. Robinson's post-conviction petition did not survive the first stage of the process, so we will confine our remarks to that stage.
Robinson's post-conviction petition turns on his allegations that the representation he received, both at trial and on direct appeal, amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel as defined in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). The Illinois Supreme Court has repeatedly held that " o demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show (1) that his attorney's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that the attorney's deficient performance resulted in prejudice to the defendant." People v. Villarreal, 198 Ill. 2d 209, 228 (2001), citing People v. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d 297, 320 (1998). "In order to establish an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, a defendant must show that 'there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.' " People v. Brooks, 334 Ill. App. 3d 722, 725 (2002), quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 674, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome, namely, that counsel's deficient performance rendered the result of the trial unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally unfair. People v. Enis, 194 Ill. 2d 361, 376-77 (2000), citing Strickland, 466 U. S. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2068; People v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 93 (1999). There is a strong presumption that counsel's performance falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Enis, 194 Ill. 2d at 376-77, citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 694-95, 104 S. Ct. at 2065. The failure to satisfy either the deficiency prong or the prejudice prong of the Strickland test precludes a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. Enis, 194 Ill. 2d at 377, citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 699, 104 S. Ct. at 2069; Wilson, 191 Ill. 2d at 370.
Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are also evaluated under the Strickland test. Enis, 194 Ill. 2d at 377, citing People v. Childress, 191 Ill. 2d 168, 175 (2000). A defendant who claims that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise an issue on appeal must allege facts demonstrating that such failure was objectively unreasonable and that counsel's decision prejudiced defendant. If the underlying issue is not meritorious, then defendant has suffered no prejudice. People v. Rogers, 197 Ill. 2d 216, 223 (2001), citing Enis, 194 Ill. 2d at 377. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the court must determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorab
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Illinois DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|