 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
People v. Robinson9/24/2003
by any district court of the United States, the sentences shall run concurrently or consecutively as determined by the court. * * * The court shall not impose consecutive sentences for offenses which were committed as part of a single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective, unless, one of the offenses for which defendant was convicted was a Class X or Class 1 felony and the defendant inflicted severe bodily injury, * * * in which event the court shall enter sentences to run consecutively. Sentences shall run concurrently unless otherwise specified by the court." (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a) (West 1996).
Initially we note that the State did not pursue this matter on direct appeal, though it had ample opportunity. We accept as an axiom that " sentence which does not conform to a statutory requirement is void." People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 107, 113 (1995), citing People v. Mapps, 198 Ill. App. 3d 521 (1990) (declaring void the portion of a sentence longer than the maximum); People v. Simmons, 256 Ill. App. 3d 651 (1993) (declaring void a sentence of probation where not permitted by statute). In Arna, the Illinois Supreme Court held that " ecause order imposing concurrent terms was void, the appellate court had the authority to correct it at any time [citation] and the actions of the appellate court were not barred by our rules which limit the State's right to appeal and which prohibit the appellate court from increasing a defendant's sentence on review." Arna, 168 Ill. 2d at 113, citing People v. Scott, 69 Ill. 2d 85 (1977). In Arna, Mapps, and Simmons, the prior sentences were, for some infirmity, void and in need of correction. The assumption in those cases, that the prior sentence was void, is precisely that, an assumption. There is no question that the taking of Tommy's life amounts to severe bodily injury. However, even though the trial court indicated prior to sentencing that the gunshot wound to Raleigh was serious, it does not automatically mean the bodily injury was severe for purposes of section 5-8-4(a). Not all gunshot wounds are per se severe bodily injury. People v. Durham, 312 Ill. App. 3d 413, 420-21 (2000). Despite the fact that Raleigh was shot in the leg, based upon the imposition of concurrent sentences, the trial court must have found no evidence of severe bodily injury. As in Durham, Raleigh McNeal's wound does not fit the definition of severe bodily injury. He was only in the hospital approximately three hours before checking himself out and going home. This was a fact that the trial court knew when determining the appropriate sentence. "It is assumed that a judge considers only competent evidence in making a finding." People v. Kozlow, 301 Ill. App. 3d 1, 8 (1998), citing People v. Tye, 141 Ill. 2d 1, 25 (1990). That assumption holds unless the record demonstrates the contrary. Kozlow, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 8, citing Tye, 141 Ill. 2d at 25. A review of the record indicates that the trial court relied on proper aggravating and mitigating factors when making the sentencing decision. The imposition of concurrent and not consecutive sentences was supported by the evidence and was not an abuse of discretion nor can it be said that it is "void." People v. Eubanks, 283 Ill. App. 3d 12, 25 (1996), citing People v. Peebles, 125 Ill. App. 3d 213, 222 (1984); see also Arna, 168 Ill. 2d at 115-117 (Nickels, J., dissenting).
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, the summary dismissal of Robinson's post-conviction petition is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
JUSTICE QUINN, dissenting.
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Illinois DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|