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State v. Spencer9/12/2003
Reporter of Decisions
Submitted on Briefs: July 9, 2003
Mary Spencer appeals from the Superior Court's (Kennebec County, Marden, J.) denial of her motion to modify the conditions of her probation. She argues that (1) the court utilized an incorrect standard in reviewing her motion and (2) that the court was compelled to find that the condition at issue was an unreasonable burden upon her. We affirm the decision of the Superior Court.
I. BACKGROUND
In 1993, Spencer killed two people while driving drunk. At the time of the crash, she had a blood-alcohol level of .18 and her two children were in the car with her. She was convicted of vehicular manslaughter and aggravated OUI in December 1995. For the manslaughter, the Superior Court (Alexander, J.) sentenced her to imprisonment for twelve years, with six years suspended, a five-year suspension of her driver's license, and six years of probation.
Among the conditions of her probation were the following: she shall "not operate or attempt to operate any motor vehicle . . . until properly licensed[,] registered and insured by the Secretary of State" and " ny vehicle that the defendant may own should have an interlocking device." (Emphasis added.) However, the language of the written order was inconsistent with the trial justice's broader language at the sentencing hearing: "that [Spencer] not operate a motor vehicle, without proper license, registration and insurance, and also, that the motor vehicle, if operated, be properly equipped with an interlock device."
(Emphasis added.)
Following her release from prison, Spencer moved to modify the condition of her probation related to the interlock device, asking the court to eliminate that requirement because she was having difficulty locating an interlock device. The Superior Court (Mills, C.J.) first ordered that the language of the written probation order be amended to reflect the sentencing judge's requirement that any vehicle that Spencer may drive must have an interlock device and then denied Spencer's motion to delete that condition of probation.
Less than two years later, Spencer again moved to modify the conditions of her probation asserting that the interlock device she was using malfunctioned regularly, and that locating repair professionals had proved almost impossible. After the hearing, the Superior Court (Marden, J.) entered an order denying the motion. In the order, the court concluded that the original sentencing judge intended to prevent Spencer from driving unless her sobriety could be assured, even if the interlock device was unavailable. The court noted that the sentencing court had "commented on [Spencer's] 19 years of heavy drinking, her history of awareness of serious consequences of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence, and evidence of the defendant receiving warnings with respect to her drinking and driving." The motion court also noted that the issues raised by Spencer in her previous motion to modify the conditions of probation were "precisely the same issues presented in the present motion." Ultimately, the motion court's "fundamental conclusion" was that "Mrs. Spencer does not have the ability, absent some significant effort, to control her consumption of alcohol." Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that the presence of the interlock condition might result in the inability of Spencer to operate a car at all during her remaining probationary period, the court denied the motion to eliminate that condition. Spencer appeals that denial.
II. DISCUSSION
We review the motion court's construction of law de novo, State v. Nastvogel, 2002 ME 97,
Page 1 2 Maine DUI Attorneys
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