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State v. Spencer9/12/2003
6, 798 A.2d 1114, 1117, and factual findings in support of a decision to modify or to decline to modify conditions of probation for clear error. State v. Collins, 681 A.2d 1168, 1171 (Me. 1996).
Spencer argues that the Superior Court applied a standard not authorized by the statute when it evaluated her motion to modify the conditions of her probation. Specifically, she argues the court should have used the "unreasonable burden" standard found in the statute and not a "change in circumstances" standard. She also argues that, regardless of what standard is used, the court should have granted her motion.
A court addressing a motion to modify conditions of probation has three options. It may modify a condition, add a condition, or relieve the defendant from a condition entirely. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1202(2) (Supp. 2002). When the court is asked to relieve the defendant entirely of a specific condition, it "may" do so if it concludes that the requirement "imposes on the person an unreasonable burden." Id.
Here, Spencer requested that the court relieve her of the condition of using an interlock device, and thus the court had the authority to eliminate that requirement if it concluded that the condition imposed an unreasonable burden on Spencer. Although not specifically stated, the court's order leads to the inescapable conclusion that the burden of using an interlock device or refraining from driving is not unreasonable on the facts of this case. Spencer's long history of drinking and driving, the resulting deaths of two people, her history of placing her own children in danger, and her inability to control her use of alcohol combined to make it reasonable to require that she not drive during her probation unless her sobriety can be assured.
Spencer argues, nonetheless, that the motion court erred in its written opinion because it based its decision in part on her failure to demonstrate a "change of circumstances." Given that Spencer had previously moved to eliminate the interlock requirement on the same grounds presented to the court in her current motion, it would not have been inappropriate for the court to have denied the motion because nothing had changed since the last motion hearing. Because the court connected the lack of changed circumstances to the time of the original sentencing, however, Spencer argues that the standard was not appropriately applied in light of the "unreasonable burden" language of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1202(2).
We need not determine whether a court may ever consider the lack of changed circumstances in addressing a motion to eliminate a condition of probation. Even if it were inappropriate to utilize a change of circumstances standard in this matter, and we make no determination on this issue, any error would be harmless because the burden of the condition was not unreasonable. M.R. Crim. P. 52(a); see also State v. White, 2002 ME 122, , 804 A.2d 1146, 1150 (upholding the trial court when it was "highly probable that the error did not affect the outcome of the trial"). Therefore, we conclude that the court did not err in denying the motion to eliminate the interlock device requirement.
The entry is: Judgment affirmed.
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