State v. Taylor7/29/2003
y and because the property in question was a newer model Chrysler Sebring convertible. Thus, there was evidence that the officers contemplated a felony arrest, and there was circumstantial evidence that the stolen property was worth more than $500, making it a felony level offense. One accused of a crime may be convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence if, viewed as a whole, the evidence establishes the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Cortis, 237 Neb. 97, 465 N.W.2d 132 (1991). See State v. Schwab, 235 Neb. 972, 458 N.W.2d 459 (1990). We conclude that there was sufficient evidence presented to support a conviction for felony operation of a motor vehicle to avoid arrest. This assignment of error is without merit.
Habitual Criminal .
Taylor next contends that the district court erred in finding Taylor to be a habitual criminal pursuant to § 29-2221, because the State failed to provide an "authenticated copy" of the former judgments and convictions. Brief for appellant at 11.
[7-9] Taylor was charged in count II as a habitual criminal under § 29-2221. Section 29-2221 does not create a separate offense, but, rather, provides for enhanced punishment where a defendant is found to be a "'habitual criminal.'" State v. Burdette, 259 Neb. 679, 706, 611 N.W.2d 615, 636 (2000). Under § 29-2221(1), a defendant convicted of a felony may be deemed a habitual criminal if the defendant has been (1) twice previously convicted of a crime, (2) sentenced, and (3) committed to prison for terms of not less than 1 year each. State v. Burdette, supra. Generally, one deemed to be a habitual criminal shall be punished by imprisonment for a mandatory minimum term of 10 years and a maximum term of not more than 60 years upon each conviction for a felony committed subsequent to the prior convictions used as the basis for the habitual criminal charge. Id.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2222 (Reissue 1995) provides:
At the hearing of any person charged with being an habitual criminal , a duly authenticated copy of the former judgment and commitment, from any court in which such judgment and commitment was had, for any of such crimes formerly committed by the party so charged, shall be competent and prima facie evidence of such former judgment and commitment.
(Emphasis supplied.)
[10,11] Requirements of "authentication" are governed by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-901 (Reissue 1995). A document is authenticated when evidence is presented that is "'sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.'" State v. Miles, 8 Neb. App. 844, 850, 602 N.W.2d 666, 671 (1999), quoting § 27-901. Accord State v. Miller, 11 Neb. App. 404, 651 N.W.2d 594 (2002). Under § 27-901, authentication can be accomplished in various ways, including by " vidence that a writing authorized by law to be recorded or filed and in fact recorded or filed in a public office, or a purported public record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any form, is from the public office where items of this nature are kept."
In State v. Linn, 248 Neb. 809, 812, 539 N.W.2d 435, 438 (1995), the Nebraska Supreme Court stated: "In order to establish evidence's sufficient probative force to prove an earlier conviction for the purpose of sentence enhancement, the evidence must, with some trustworthiness, reflect a court's act of rendering judgment." In Linn, the Supreme Court found that an unsigned judgment of a prior driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) conviction could not be used for sentence enhancement for a third-offense DUI conviction, despite a stipulation in the record of another DUI conviction that it had been the defenda
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