State v. Mata9/5/2003
e court is not obligated to engage in an analysis which is not needed to adjudicate the case and controversy before it. State v. Lee, 265 Neb. 663, 658 N.W.2d 669 (2003).
We note, in particular, that Mata has presented this court with a record containing a considerable amount of evidence intended to show that electrocution, as a mode of execution, violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. We are aware that recent events at the U.S. Supreme Court may cast doubt upon whether that Court will continue to regard electrocution as consistent with the Eighth Amendment. See, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed. 2d 335 (2002); Bryan v. Moore, 528 U.S. 960, 120 S.Ct. 394, 145 L.Ed. 2d 306 (1999) (granting certiorari on question), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted 528 U.S. 1133, 120 S.Ct. 1003, 145 L.Ed. 2d 927 (2000) (dismissing certiorari due to legislative enactment of lethal injection); Campbell v. Wood, 511 U.S. 1119, 114 S.Ct. 2125, 128 L.Ed. 2d 682 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari; Stevens and Ginsburg, JJ., voting to grant stay of execution); Poyner v. Murray, 508 U.S. 931, 113 S.Ct. 2397, 124 L.Ed. 2d 299 (1993) (Souter, J., joined by Blackmun and Stevens, JJ., respecting denial of petition for writ of certiorari). However, the possibility remains that Mata will not be resentenced to death, or that the Nebraska Legislature will address this issue prior to the conclusion of Mata's resentencing. See, e.g., L.B. 526, 98th Leg., 1st Sess. Therefore, we do not address Mata's assignment of error regarding electrocution at this time.
[53,54] Before we discuss the proceedings for Mata's resentencing, however, we do consider Mata's final assignment of error: that the sentence of death was excessive. Nebraska's capital sentencing procedures have the characteristics which the U.S. Supreme Court found to resemble a trial in Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 101 S.Ct. 1852, 68 L.Ed. 2d 270 (1981), and double jeopardy concerns attach at a capital sentencing hearing in Nebraska. State v. Palmer, 257 Neb. 702, 600 N.W.2d 756 (1999). Under Bullington, a defendant who has been impliedly acquitted of the death penalty cannot again be placed in jeopardy of a capital sentence. While the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the federal and state Constitutions do not protect against a second prosecution for the same offense where a conviction is reversed for trial error, they bar retrial if the reversal is necessitated because the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain the conviction. State v. Yelli, 247 Neb. 785, 530 N.W.2d 250 (1995). Therefore, before the cause is remanded for resentencing, we determine whether the evidence presented by the State was sufficient to sustain the conviction. See State v. Sheets, 260 Neb. 325, 618 N.W.2d 117 (2000).
A lengthy reexamination of the evidence set forth above is not necessary to dispose of this assignment of error. The evidence indicates that the blunt force trauma inflicted on Adam, and his dismemberment, occurred at or near the time of his death. It suffices to say that based on our de novo review of the record made in this proceeding, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to conclude that Adam's murder was "especially heinous, atrocious, cruel, or manifested exceptional depravity by ordinary standards of morality and intelligence" within the meaning of § 29-2523(1)(d), and that this aggravating factor outweighed the mitigating factors supported by the record. Mata has not been "acquitted" of the death penalty under Bullington. Mata's final assignment of error is without merit.
(c) Resentencing Proceedings
After the U.S. Supreme Court's dec
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