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State v. Flake8/5/2003
nd convincing were we fact finders. Appellate courts do not re- weigh the evidence or re-assess credibility determinations. These tasks are within the province of the jury. While the proof in this record indicates that the defendant suffers from a mental disorder, such proof does not mandate a jury finding that a defendant is legally insane. Cf. Coe v. State, 17 S.W.3d 193, 221 (Tenn. 2000) (" he existence of a mental disorder does not automatically translate into a finding of incompetency to be executed."); Reed, 997 F.2d at 334 ("Insanity, for our purposes, is a legal term. We do not ask whether Reed is insane by psychiatric or psychological standards."). In determining whether a defendant is insane, a jury is entitled to consider all the evidence offered, including the facts surrounding the crime, the testimony of lay witnesses, and expert testimony. While a jury may not arbitrarily ignore evidence, a jury is not bound to accept the testimony of experts where the evidence is contested. Indeed, this principle is explicitly reflected in the current statute which prohibits experts from testifying on the ultimate issue of the defendant's sanity and reserves this issue for the trier of fact alone.
88 S.W.3d at 556. In reversing the jury's verdict, the Court of Criminal Appeals' opinion appears not to have considered the evidence elicited by the prosecution through vigorous cross-examination. The intermediate appellate court instead focused upon the State's failure to offer rebuttal proof. As noted in Flake I, the statute does not require the prosecution to offer rebuttal proof, although the prosecution likely will counter defense proof by some means, including vigorous cross-examination. After reviewing all the evidence in this record in the light most favorable to the State, this Court is unable to conclude that no reasonable trier of fact could have failed to find that the defendant's criminal insanity at the time of the offense was established by clear and convincing evidence. Therefore, that portion of the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals modifying the jury's verdict to not guilty by reason of insanity is reversed.
Suppression
The defendant argued in his brief to this Court that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because he was not mentally capable of knowingly and intelligently consenting to a search or waiving his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed.2d 694 (1966). The State claims that collateral estoppel precludes the defendant from re-litigating this issue. As support for this claim, the State points out that the claim was explicitly rejected in an opinion on petition to rehear in Flake I, 88 S.W.3d at 561, that the parties are the same, and that the evidence is the same. While collateral estoppel likely could be applied in this circumstance, having thoroughly reviewed the entire record, we choose to address the defendant's contention on its merits.
" trial court's findings of fact in a suppression hearing will be upheld unless the evidence preponderates otherwise." State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996). "Questions of credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, and resolution of conflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of fact." Id.; see also State v. England, 19 S.W.3d 762, 766 (Tenn. 2000). As such, "the prevailing party in the trial court is afforded the 'strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn from that evidence.' " See State v. Carter, 16 S.W.3d 762, 765 (Tenn. 2000) (quoting State v. Keith, 978 S.W.2d 861, 864 (Tenn. 1998)). Applying these principles, we are of
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