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State v. Flake8/5/2003
the opinion that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's finding that the defendant was mentally capable of knowingly and intelligently consenting to a search and of waiving his rights under Miranda. Accordingly, the defendant's assertion that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress is without merit.
Conclusion
Reviewing this record in the light most favorable to the State, this Court reverses that portion of the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals modifying the verdict to not guilty by reason of insanity. As to the suppression issue, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed. The judgment of the trial court is reinstated. It appearing that the defendant is indigent, costs on appeal are assessed to the State of Tennessee, for which execution may issue if necessary.
Adolpho A. Birch, Jr., J., dissenting.
Although I fully concur with Justice Anderson's well reasoned dissent, I write separately to elaborate on the overriding principle expressed therein: the conduct relied upon by the majority as indicia of sanity is conduct that also is a symptom of mental illness that affected the defendant's ability to appreciate the nature or wrongfulness of his acts at the time of the offenses. The law does not intend that circumstantial evidence that would establish criminal intent in a "reasonable" person also be sufficient to convict a person who, by law, is considered "unreasonable."
Undisputed in the record is the fact that the defendant suffers from paranoid schizophrenia. Undisputed also is the fact that the symptoms of this disease may affect one's ability to understand the wrongfulness of his or her acts. While periods of remission are common with this disease, courts have universally accepted expert psychiatric testimony that when a person with paranoid schizophrenia is symptomatic, he or she will still behave "normally" in many respects. Specifically, this Court has concluded that when determining whether a defendant who suffers from paranoid schizophrenia is legally insane, "proof of proper job functioning and normal appearance on the part of a paranoid schizophrenic is of questionable value." Forbes v. State, 559 S.W.2d 318, 325 (Tenn. 1977); see United States v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154, 1160 (11th Cir. 1983) (stating that " paranoid schizophrenic, though he may appear normal and his judgment on matters outside his delusional system may remain intact, may harbor delusions of grandeur or persecution that grossly distort his reactions to events").
Thus, the symptoms of paranoid schizophrenia include "normal" behavior. "Normal" behavior is, in fact, consistent with the diagnosed illness. Consequently, it is legally illogical, and unfair as well, to allow an inference of sanity to be drawn from one's ability to behave "normally" prior to committing a crime. It is irrelevant whether a reasonable person who acted similarly would be considered to have premeditated a revengeful act. What is relevant, however, is whether the defendant was so delusional at the time of the offense that he lacked the ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his acts.
Accordingly, I also would affirm the determination of the Court of Criminal Appeals that no reasonable trier of fact could have failed to find that the defendant was insane at the time of the offense. Having articulated the expanded view which led me to write separately, I join the dissenting opinion authored by Justice Anderson to the extent it does not conflict with the views herein expressed.
ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., JUSTICE
E. Riley Anderson, J., dissenting.
The majority has concluded th
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