 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
People v. Calhoun11/2/2004
and abetted that crime;
"3. That a co-principal in that crime committed the [two vehicular manslaughter with gross negligence and other charged offenses]; and
"That those [charged] crimes ... were a natural and probable consequence of the commission of the crime of speed contest."
C
Calhoun asserts section 20001, subdivision (c) does not apply to persons who do not personally or directly commit one of the listed underlying offenses, here vehicular manslaughter with gross negligence. He argues that section 20001, subdivision (c)'s text and legislative history and analogous case law support an interpretation that the enhancement applies only to direct perpetrators of an underlying offense and not to those convicted of aiding and abetting the direct perpetrators. The parties have not cited, and we have not found, any cases interpreting section 20001, subdivision (c) in the context of *1040 aiding and abetting an underlying offense. We therefore consider the instant question of law to be one of first impression.
In reviewing a trial court's interpretation of a statute, we apply an independent or de novo standard of review. (Burden v. Snowden (1992) 2 Cal.4th 556, 562, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 531, 828 P.2d 672.) In interpreting a statute, our objective is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. (Ibid.) We look first to the language of the statute and give effect to its plain meaning. (Ibid.) Although we look first to the text of the statute, we also may consider extrinsic aids. (Ibid.) "When the language is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, we look to the legislative history of the statute and the wider historical circumstances of its enactment in ascertaining the legislative intent. [Citation.]" (Clayton v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 28, 32, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 750.) Furthermore, if a penal statute's language is reasonably susceptible of two constructions, the construction more favorable to the criminal defendant will be adopted. (People v. Davis (1981) 29 Cal.3d 814, 828, 176 Cal.Rptr. 521, 633 P.2d 186.)
Known as "Courtney's Law," section 20001, subdivision (c) was enacted in 1996. (Stats.1996, ch. 645, § 1, p. 2982.) It provides a consecutive five-year enhancement in addition to the punishment prescribed for a qualifying underlying offense (e.g., Pen.Code, § 192, subd. (c)(1)) if the jury finds the defendant fled the scene of the crime after committing that underlying offense. (§ 20001, subd. (c).) The statutory language does not expressly state whether the enhancement applies to persons who only aided and abetted the commission of an underlying offense, in addition to those persons who directly committed the underlying **543 offense. Accordingly, we must interpret section 20001, subdivision (c) to resolve the issue of whether that statute applies to persons who merely aided and abetted the commission of an underlying offense.
We look first to the text of section 20001, subdivision (c). The crucial term is "committing" in the phrase "person who flees the scene of the crime after committing a violation of [an underlying offense]." (§ 20001, subd. (c).) A common definition of "commit" is "to do; perform; perpetrate...." (Random House Dict. of the English Language (2d ed.1987), p. 412, col. 2.) The preferred usage of its variant, "commission," is, according to one authority, "in the sense 'the action of doing or perpetrating (as a crime).' " (Garner, A Dict. of Modern Legal Usage (2d ed.1995), p. 176.) Penal Code section 31, enacted in 1872, defines as "principals":
"All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, ... whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its commission, ... are principals in any crime so committed." (Italics added.)
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 California DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|