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People v. Calhoun11/2/2004
liability was intended, we concluded in Walker that the statute should be interpreted to apply only to defendants who personally used a firearm." (Piper, at p. 476, 229 Cal.Rptr. 125, 722 P.2d 899, italics added.) Piper noted:
"Since Walker, the Legislature has been quite explicit when it intends an enhancement provision to apply to a defendant even though he himself does not commit the proscribed act. For example, [Penal Code] section 12022, subdivision (a)--which provides a one-year enhancement for '[a]ny person who is armed with a firearm in the commission ... of a felony'--goes on specifically to provide that '[t]his additional term shall apply to any person who is a principal in the commission or attempted commission of a felony if one or more of the principals is armed with a firearm, whether or not such person is personally armed with a firearm.'
"[Penal Code section 1192.7,] [s]ubdivision (c)(8), of course, contains no similar language indicating that it was intended to apply even when the defendant himself did not personally use a firearm. Accordingly, the principle of interpretation applied in Walker supports the conclusion that the subdivision should be construed to apply only to defendants who personally use a firearm in the commission of a felony." (People v. Piper, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 477, 229 Cal.Rptr. 125, 722 P.2d 899, fn. omitted.)
*1044 Piper also cited the general rule that statutory ambiguities be resolved in a criminal defendant's favor and concluded the enhancement applied only to defendants who personally use a firearm in the commission of a felony. (Id. at pp. 477-478, 229 Cal.Rptr. 125, 722 P.2d 899; see also People v. Rener (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 258, 267, 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 392 [holding Penal Code section 12022.3's enhancements for a person's use of or being armed with a firearm applies only to direct perpetrators and not to those vicariously liable as aiders and abettors].)
People v. Alvarez (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 403, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 515 described the Walker rule: "[T]o find the statute has vicarious application, there must be an express legislative direction to that effect." (Alvarez, at p. 409, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 515.) Alvarez concluded in its circumstances: **546 "[S]ince we find no Legislative direction to the contrary, we interpret the '[a]ny person who used, or attempted to use, a deadly weapon' language in [Penal Code] section 1203, subdivision (e)(2) as limiting application to personal use of a deadly weapon." (Ibid., italics added.)
As Calhoun also notes, there is a general rule that statutory language should be resolved in favor of a criminal defendant to the extent reasonably possible. Keeler v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 619, 87 Cal.Rptr. 481, 470 P.2d 617 (superseded by statute on another ground as noted in People v. Taylor (2004) 32 Cal.4th 863, 870, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 510, 86 P.3d 881) stated: "It is the policy of this state to construe a penal statute as favorably to the defendant as its language and the circumstances of its application may reasonably permit; just as in the case of a question of fact, the defendant is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt as to the true interpretation of words or the construction of language used in a statute. [Citation.]" (Keeler, at p. 631, 87 Cal.Rptr. 481, 470 P.2d 617.) Application of that general rule in Calhoun's case supports an interpretation of section 20001, subdivision (c) that its five-year enhancement applies only to persons who directly commit the underlying offense and not to persons who aid or abet the direct perpetrator.
Considering the language of section 20001, subdivision (c), its legislative history, analogous case law, and the general rule of statutory interpretation in favor of a criminal defendant, we conclude se
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