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State v. Paz-Lucero12/11/2003
most significant." Spreitz, 190 Ariz. at 139-40, 945 P.2d at 1270-71.
Paz-Lucero maintains that the delay prejudiced him by denying him the opportunity to serve his sentence concurrently with one he was serving in the unrelated case. In denying Paz-Lucero's motion to dismiss, the trial court found this argument merely "speculative" and determined that no "actual prejudice" had been established. We find no error in that determination.
As the state submits, nothing in the record indicates that Paz-Lucero would have received concurrent sentences. See A.R.S. § 13-708. Paz-Lucero does not assert that the July 1999 plea agreement offered concurrent sentences, and points to nothing, save pure speculation, to indicate that concurrent sentences were a probable outcome. See, e.g., State v. Leslie, 147 Ariz. 38, 708 P.2d 719 (1985) (asserted prejudice must be actual, not speculative); State v. Vincent, 147 Ariz. 6, 708 P.2d 97 (App. 1985) (same). In that vein, Paz-Lucero's reliance on State v. Adler, 189 Ariz. 280, 942 P.2d 439 (1997), for the proposition that he suffered actual prejudice from this alleged missed opportunity, is misplaced for a number of reasons, including that, in Adler, the county attorney specifically had agreed to recommend concurrent sentences for the defendant. No such statement or agreement existed here.
Given Paz-Lucero's failure to advise the trial court of an impending violation of his speedy trial rights, see Barker; Spreitz (failure to timely object to speedy trial violation weighs against relief on constitutional ground), and his failure to establish actual prejudice, we discern no constitutional violation. See United States v. Doggett, 505 U.S. 647, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 120 L. Ed. 2d 520 (1992) (requiring showing of prejudice).
State constitutional right to speedy trial
We agree with the state that, on appeal, Paz-Lucero has failed to adequately frame, argue or support a separate Arizona constitutional argument distinct from his federal constitutional argument. Because he has not explained how this separately stated ground for relief may have entitled him to dismissal of the charges, he has waived the argument. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.13(c), 17 A.R.S.; see also State v. Bolton, 182 Ariz. 290, 896 P.2d 830 (1995); State v. Nirschel, 155 Ariz. 206, 745 P.2d 953 (1987).
We affirm.
J. WILLIAM BRAMMER, JR., Presiding Judge
CONCURRING:
M. JAN FLOREZ, Judge
JOSEPH W. HOWARD, Judge
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