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People v. Fritschler10/9/2003
ORDER AFFIRMED
Nieto and Carparelli, JJ., concur
Defendant, Steven Fritschler, appeals the trial court order denying his Crim. P. 35 motion for post-conviction relief. We affirm.
In exchange for the dismissal of other counts, defendant pleaded guilty to first degree aggravated motor vehicle theft, a class three felony, and misdemeanor counts of driving under the influence and second degree aggravated motor vehicle theft. Defendant initially received a deferred judgment and sentence, which was later revoked. Defendant was then resentenced to six years in the Department of Corrections (DOC), with his misdemeanor sentences to be served concurrently.
Defendant filed a Crim. P. 35(b) motion for reduction of sentence, and the trial court reduced his DOC sentence to four years. The court later ordered that the mittimus be corrected to reflect that defendant must serve a five-year period of mandatory parole upon completion of his DOC sentence, as required by § 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(A), C.R.S. 2002.
Defendant then filed a Crim. P. 35(a) motion for post-conviction relief, in which he argued that the addition of the mandatory parole term to his sentence violated his right to equal protection of the laws. The trial court denied the motion.
I.
As an initial matter on appeal, we note the parties' contentions regarding the applicability of the time bar for the filing of post-conviction motions in § 16-5-402, C.R.S. 2002, and the proper consideration of defendant's motion under Crim. P. 35(a) or (c).
However, because the trial court considered the issues on the merits, we elect to address defendant's appeal without resolving the various procedural arguments the parties have raised. See People v. Munkus, 60 P.3d 767, 769 (Colo. App. 2002).
II.
Defendant contends his right to equal protection of the laws is violated because he is required to serve a term of mandatory parole, while sex offenders in the same felony class instead serve discretionary parole. We disagree.
A.
In People v. Friesen, 45 P.3d 784, 785 (Colo. App. 2001), a division of this court rejected this argument, concluding that the different felony classifications merely set forth the penalty ranges for classes of offenses and do not create classes of offenders. The division determined that an offender's felony class alone does not create a classification for equal protection purposes, because each class encompasses many different crimes that do not involve the same or similar criminal conduct. Thus, no equal protection violation occurs because a defendant is only similarly situated with defendants who commit the same or similar acts, and non-sexual offenders are not similarly situated with sex offenders.
Defendant argues that Friesen was wrongly decided and we should decline to follow it. However, we disagree and conclude that it is persuasive with respect to this portion of defendant's equal protection argument.
B.
In a variation on the argument raised in Friesen, defendant also asserts that, because the purposes of parole are the same for all felony offenders, see § 17-22.5-102.5, C.R.S. 2002, all felony offenders are "similarly situated" for the purposes of equal protection analysis, even if their crimes are completely dissimilar.
In People v. Walker, 75 P.3d 722 (Colo. App. 2002), a division of this court rejected this argument. The division agreed with the logic of Friesen and further concluded that, because sex offenders and non-sexual offenders are subject to different parole laws, they are not similarly situated for purposes of parole. We
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