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Sorrell v. State10/15/2003
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING AND CLARIFICATION
We grant the State's motion for rehearing and clarification, withdraw our previous opinion, and substitute the following.
Woodrow Sorrell appeals his conviction of driving while his license was permanently revoked, contrary to section 322.341, Florida Statutes (2001). Although we reject appellant's attacks upon the evidence at trial, we reverse appellant's conviction in light of Florida Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Critchfield, 842 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 2003).
Contrary to appellant's argument, at the non-jury trial, the state proved by competent evidence that appellant's license had been revoked. A copy of his driving record was properly admitted pursuant to section 322.201, Florida Statutes (2001). Notice of the revocation was established pursuant to section 322.251(2), Florida Statutes (2001). See State v. Tucker, 832 So. 2d 218, 218-19 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (holding that computerized driving record is sufficient to establish a prima facie case that defendant's driver's license has been revoked, and that indication of notice in record is sufficient evidence that the defendant received notice of the revocation); Rodgers v. State, 804 So. 2d 480, 483 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).
It was not necessary for the state to prove at trial the DUI convictions which formed the basis for the license revocation. Appellant cites to cases under the DUI statute, where previous convictions constitute an element of the crime charged. See Jackson v. State, 788 So. 2d 373, 374 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) review denied, 807 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 2002); Coyne v. State, 775 So. 2d 969, 969-70 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (holding that jury must consider whether the defendant has been convicted of the three prior DUIs before concluding the defendant is guilty of felony DUI). Here, it is the existence of the revocation which is an element of the crime charged, not the prior DUI convictions.
Confronting a statute similar to the one at issue in this case, this court has disposed of an argument identical to the one appellant makes here. Section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (2001), prohibits driving while license is suspended (DWLS) as an habitual offender. See Rodgers, 804 So. 2d at 483. We held in Rodgers that the statute did
not involve - - as an element of the crime - - a finding that the motorist has been convicted on three separate occasions of DWLS. Instead it involves driving a motor vehicle on the public highways of Florida at a time when DMV has revoked the motorist's license and given notice of the revocation. Thus it is not necessary for the state to prove each separate conviction of DWLS which DMV relied on in revoking the license.
Id. (emphasis added). We wrote in Rodgers,
o sum up the requirements for a conviction under section 322.34, the statute as written by the Legislature merely makes it necessary for the state to prove by competent evidence that DMV maintains a record on the motorist, that its record shows the requisite three separate DWLS convictions within a 5 year period, and that DMV gave the motorist the statutory notice. These statutes permit the state to make this proof by presenting a certified copy of the motorist's driving record maintained by DMV. That is what the state did in its prosecution in this case. Hence the state made out a prima facie case, which allowed the trier of fact to find defendant guilty of the section 322.34(5) violation.
Id.; see also State v. Fields, 809 So. 2d 99, 101 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (following Rodgers). Because the statute in Rodgers is so similar to section 322.341, Rodgers compels the conclusio
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