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Stone v. State10/22/2003
Michael Stone pled not guilty to DUI and was sentenced to thirty days in the Broward County Jail and two years of probation. When entering this plea, Stone properly reserved the right to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress sobriety test results. We consider this issue on appeal and affirm.
Early on the morning of August 20, 2001, Broward County Sheriff's Deputy Jeffrey Bell was on road patrol. At the time of the incident giving rise to this case, Bell's patrol car was parked in the lot of a Mobil station in unincorporated Pompano Beach and he had three prisoners from an unrelated incident in his backseat. Bell observed Stone drive his 49cc Yamaha scooter into the adjacent 7-Eleven parking lot. Bell knew Stone from prior encounters regarding the scooter, and knew that Stone's driver's license had been suspended as recently as July 2001. Stone was not wearing a helmet or eye protection, nor did Bell know whether Stone was insured.
As a result of these observations, Bell called to Stone by name over the microphone in his patrol car after Stone exited the 7-Eleven and mounted his scooter. Bell called to Stone a second time before Stone walked in Bell's direction to speak to him outside the patrol car. Bell asked Stone for his driver's license, which Stone showed him as it had been reinstated the previous day. However, during this process, Bell detected the odor of alcohol on Stone's breath and administered the requisite field sobriety tests, which Stone failed. Bell arrested Stone for DUI, and took him to the station for further sobriety testing. Stone moved to suppress the results of these tests on the ground that Bell did not have probable cause to stop Stone. The motion was denied following an evidentiary hearing.
A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress comes to this Court clothed with a presumption of correctness, so that trial court resolution of factual and evidentiary conflicts should not be disturbed on appeal. Glover v. State, 677 So. 2d 374, 376 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (citing McNamara v. State, 357 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 1978)). However, this Court reviews de novo the application of the law to such facts to determine the existence of the probable cause necessary to satisfy a Fourth Amendment inquiry. Porter v. State, 765 So. 2d 76, 77 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (en banc) (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 691 (1996)).
When a law enforcement officer stops a motor vehicle, the action amounts to a detention of the driver implicating the Fourth Amendment restriction against unreasonable searches and seizures. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-810 (1996) (citations omitted). As a result, the officer must have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has been committed. Id. at 810 (citations omitted). Probable cause has been defined as "where the facts and circumstances within an officer's knowledge and of which he had reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been committed." State v. Byham, 394 So. 2d 1142, 1143 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) (citing Benefield v. State, 160 So. 2d 706, 708) (Fla. 1964)). Therefore, the issue on appeal requires a two-pronged analysis under Whren: (1) whether Bell's calling to Stone was a traffic stop and (2) whether Bell had probable cause to effect such a traffic stop.
The first prong of this analysis raises the question of whether Bell's calling to Stone was something less than a traffic stop, specifically a consensual encounter, as asserted by the State below and on appeal. A consensual encounter exists where an individual may choose to comply with or disregard a law enforcement officer
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