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Stone v. State10/22/2003
encounters with Stone, Bell knew that he was sixteen or older at the time of the incident and knew or should have known that his scooter had a displacement of only 49 cubic centimeters, squarely fitting him into the exception from the helmet and eye protection requirements. Furthermore, the insurance requirement does not apply to Stone, because it applies only in cases of riders of 51cc or greater vehicles, over the age of 21, who elect to purchase insurance rather than wear a helmet. See § Fla. Stat., 316.211(3)(b). Thus, we conclude Bell did not have probable cause to stop Stone for perceived safety violations.
We also reject the State's contention that even if Bell lacked probable cause, he had a good faith belief that Stone was violating the statute when he called to him. The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule of evidence, which would cure any failure of probable cause and resulting inadmissibility of evidence, is based on an objective standard and expects officers to know the law. See Doctor v. State, 596 So. 2d 442, 447 (Fla. 1992) (citations omitted); see generally Allstate Ins. Co. v. Bowne, 817 So. 2d 994, 997 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)) (describing good faith exception). It is not unreasonable to expect that a road patrol officer, especially one who had stopped Stone twice in the past based on similar circumstances, should know the law applicable to scooters that travel on the road. Therefore, we conclude that the good faith exception does not apply to Bell's stop of Stone for perceived safety violations. Consequently, because Bell lacked probable cause to stop Stone for alleged safety violations and the good faith exception does not apply, the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress the sobriety test results cannot be supported on the basis of these safety violations.
In sum, we conclude that Bell's hailing Stone was a permissible traffic stop because Bell had probable cause to suspect Stone was committing a traffic violation by driving his scooter with a suspended license. As a result, the trial court did not err by denying Stone's motion to suppress the sobriety test evidence and we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
FARMER, C.J., GUNTHER and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.
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