 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Reedman v. State12/19/2003
e jury. By cautioning Reedman as he did, the judge was simply charging on a point of law and not commenting on the evidence. Hendrix v. State, 230 Ga. App. 604 (3) (497 SE2d 236) (1997). We find no error.
12. Reedman contends the State exercised its peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner to remove three African-Americans from the jury in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (106 SC 1712, 90 LE2d 69) (1986). As we have held, a trial court's decision on a Batson motion "rests largely upon assessment of the prosecutor's state of mind and credibility; it therefore lies peculiarly within a trial judge's province. Accordingly, we review the trial court's denial of the Batson motion under a clearly erroneous standard." (Footnotes and punctuation omitted). Jones v. State, 261 Ga. App. 698, 701 (2) (583 SE2d 546) (2003).
The prosecutor struck Juror #3 because the juror expressed doubts and concerns about the fairness of a legal system that would allow Reedman to represent himself; the prosecutor struck Juror #6 because the juror was extremely nervous, confused, and had problems following the voir dire questions; the prosecutor struck Juror #15 because the juror had been convicted in Fulton County for driving under the influence of alcohol and expressed negative feelings toward law enforcement. Based on these explanations, we conclude the trial court was not clearly erroneous in denying Reedman's Batson challenge because the prosecutor gave race-neutral reasons for the strikes and these reasons were not a pretext for purposeful discrimination. Id.
13. Reedman contends the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences for his misdemeanor convictions for obstruction and fleeing. Whether those sentences are legal is an issue which is not properly before us. As Reedman admits, the convictions upon which those sentences were based were the result of his previous trial. He had an opportunity to litigate those claims of error in his appeal from that trial, an appeal which was dismissed because he failed to comply with this Court's rules. A criminal defendant is not entitled to a second direct appeal from his judgment of conviction. Richards v. State, 275 Ga. at 191.
14. In his final enumeration of error, Reedman contends the trial court erred in sentencing him as a recidivist under OCGA § 17-10-7 (a) because his prior convictions were "not in his name," were made without benefit of counsel, or were overturned on appeal. The record plainly shows, however, that one of Reedman's prior convictions was a guilty plea to a 1998 charge against "David Reedman" for entering an auto. This single, prior felony conviction is sufficient to authorize recidivist punishment. OCGA § 17-10-7 (a); Scott v. State, 216 Ga. App. 692, 697-698 (8) (455 SE2d 609) (1995) (physical precedent only). The certified copies of the plea reveal that Reedman was represented by counsel and signed his own name to the plea documents. Thus, the State was entitled to a presumption of regularity and the burden shifted to Reedman to show an infringement of his rights or a procedural irregularity in the plea. Nash v. State, 271 Ga. 281, 284 (519 SE2d 893) (1999). This he failed to do. Consequently, Reedman has failed to demonstrate any error in his sentencing. Id.
Judgment affirmed. Blackburn, P. J., and Phipps, J., concur.
Page 1 2 3 4 5 Georgia DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|