State v. Smith12/26/2003
wai[`]i Revised Statutes, within the time of the maximum sentence of the prior conviction, shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment without possibility of parole. Section 706-606.5(1), H.R.S.
3. Under rules of statutory construction, the foremost obligation is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, which is obtained primarily from the language contained in the statutes themselves. State v. Cornelio, 84 Hawai[`]i 476, 935 P.2d 1021 (1997).
8. Based upon the plain meaning of Section 706-606.5 of the Hawai[`]i Revised Statutes, the Court is required to sentence Defendant to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
It is HEREBY ORDERED that the aforesaid Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence is hereby denied.
On March 27, 2003, Smith filed a timely notice of appeal from the circuit court's judgment of conviction and sentence.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A "cardinal" canon of statutory construction is that this court "cannot change the language of the statute, supply a want, or enlarge upon it in order to make it suit a certain state of facts." State v. Dudoit, 90 Hawaii 262, 271, 978 P.2d 700, 709 (1999) (quoting State v. Buch, 83 Hawaii 308, 326, 926 P.2d 599, 617 (1996) (Levinson, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting State v. Meyer, 61 Haw. 74, 78, 595 P.2d 288, 291 (1979))). This is because " e do not legislate or make laws." Dudoit, 90 Hawaii at 271, 978 P.2d at 709 (citations omitted). . . . ee also id. at 270 n.8, 978 P.2d at 708 n.8 (" s Justice Ramil himself aptly observed, as author of this court's opinion in State v. Richie, 88 Hawaii 19, 30, 960 P.2d 1227, 1230 (1998), ' t is a cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that, where the terms of a statute are plain, unambiguous and explicit, we are not at liberty to look beyond that language for a different meaning. Instead, our sole duty is to give effect to the statute's plain and obvious meaning.'" (Citations omitted.) (Some brackets added and some in original.)).
State v. Mueller, 102 Hawaii 391, 394, 76 P.3d 943, 946 (2003) (quoting State v. Yamada, 99 Hawaii 542, 552-53, 57 P.3d 467, 477-78, reconsideration denied, 100 Hawaii 295, 59 P.3d 930 (2002) (some brackets added and some in original)).
III. DISCUSSION
Smith contends that the circuit court erred in failing to sentence her in accordance with HRS § 706-622.5, see supra note 4, arguing that the plain language, legislative history, and legislative intent of the first-time drug offender sentencing statute require its application in lieu of HRS § 706-606.5,see supra note 3. Smith also asserts that the interrelationship of the two statutes is ambiguous and that HRS § 706-622.5 "trumps" HRS § 706-606.5, inasmuch as the "rule of lenity," as well as the canon of statutory interpretation favoring application of specific over general statutes, requires sentencing of Smith as a first-time drug offender rather than as a repeat offender. The prosecution responds, inter alia, that, based on the plain language of HRS §§ 706-606.5 and -622.5, the circuit court did not err in sentencing Smith pursuant to the repeat offender statute. For the reasons discussed infra, we agree with the prosecution and hold that HRS § 706-606.5, by its plain and unambiguous language, applies notwithstanding the sentencing provisions of HRS § 706-622.5.
We have observed that "' t is a cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that, where the terms of a statute are plain, unambiguous and explicit, we are not at liberty to look beyond that language for a different meaning." Mueller, 102 Hawaii at 394, 76 P.3d at
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