 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
People v. Elizalde12/3/2003
a "fine." 725 ILCS 5/110--14 (West 2002). Section 110--14, however, does not provide for credit against a "fee" or a "cost." People v. White, 333 Ill. App. 3d 777, 782 (2002).
As a means of determining legislative intent, case law has examined the substance of various assessments to determine whether they are more nearly "fines" or "fees" or "costs." See, e.g., People v. Littlejohn, 338 Ill. App. 3d 281 (2003); White, 333 Ill. App. 3d 777. Under this line of cases, a "fine" is a pecuniary punishment imposed as part of a criminal sentence. White, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 781. A "fee," by contrast, is a charge for labor or services, especially professional services. White, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 781. A "cost" is a charge or fee taxed by a court, such as a filing fee, jury fee, courthouse fee, or reporter fee. A cost or fee is not punitive in nature but is a collateral consequence of the defendant's conviction that is compensatory in nature. White, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 781. We note, however, that, because the applicability of section 110--14 to a particular assessment is a question of legislative intent, an assessment's substantive character as being more nearly a "fine" or a "fee" or a "cost" is relevant only to the extent that it is probative of legislative intent. Also relevant is the legislature's designation of the assessment as a "fine," "fee," or "cost."
The assessment at issue was authorized by section 5--1101(d) of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/5--1101(d) (West 2002)). Section 5--1101 provides in relevant part:
"Additional fees to finance the court system. A county board may enact by ordinance or resolution the following fees:
(d) A $100 fee for the second and subsequent violations of Section 11--501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code or violations of similar provisions contained in county or municipal ordinances committed in the county. The proceeds of this fee shall be placed in the county general fund and used to finance education programs related to driving under the influence of alcohol *." 55 ILCS 5/5--1101 (West 2002).
This language, by its repeated use of the word "fee"and its description of a non-punitive purpose, indicates an intent on the part of the legislature that an assessment made under section 5--1101(d) be treated as a fee and not a fine. We conclude that the legislature did not intend the $5-per-day credit for time served provided for in section 110--14 to apply to "fees" imposed under section 5--1101(d). Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to $5-per-day credit against the $100 fee imposed by the trial court.
For the foregoing reasons, we modify the judgment order and sentencing order to reflect the fact that defendant has been convicted of a Class 3 felony and modify the sentencing order to reflect that defendant is to receive 93 days' credit for time served. We also vacate the part of the sentencing order specifying the length of defendant's sentence on the driving-under-the-influence-of-alcohol count and remand to the trial court with directions to enter a new sentence based on the guidelines for a Class 3 felony. Finally, we affirm the trial court's decision not to give defendant $5-per-day credit against the fee it imposed.
Affirmed in part as modified and vacated in part; cause remanded with directions.
BOWMAN and GROMETER, JJ., concur.
|