 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
People v. Jones12/5/2003
ment of Public Act 88--632, nonconsensual chemical testing of a suspected impaired driver was permissible in all circumstances. Ford, 145 Ill. App. 3d at 21. Nonconsensual chemical testing does not violate an individual's constitutional rights so long as a police officer has probable cause to believe that the individual was operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or both. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 918, 86 S. Ct. at 1834; Todd, 59 Ill. 2d at 544. By way of Public Act 88--632, the legislature added section 11--501.2(c)(2) to the Vehicle Code, which explicitly authorizes the nonconsensual chemical testing of a suspected impaired driver where the driver has caused death or bodily injury to another. However, because this was already permissible before the enactment of Public Act 88--632, we can only conclude that by adding section 11--501.2(c)(2), the legislature intended to prohibit nonconsensual chemical testing of a suspected impaired driver in situations that did not involve death or bodily injury. To rule otherwise would reduce section 11--501.2(c)(2) to meaningless surplusage and render the passage of Public Act 88--632 pointless. This we decline to do.
We are mindful that our interpretation of section 11--501.2(c)(2) will make enforcement of our driving-under-the-influence laws more difficult. However, we are bound by the language and the legislative history of the statute. We encourage the legislature to revisit section 11--501.1(c)(2) and to consider the provision's effect on public safety.
In conclusion, the defendant in this case was subjected to nonconsensual chemical testing. Because he did not cause death or personal injury to another, the trial court properly excluded the test results.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
HUTCHINSON, P.J., and BYRNE, J., concur.
|