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People v. Kelly12/10/2003
PUBLISHED
Defendant, James J. Kelly, was charged in the circuit court of Du Page County with driving under the influence of alcohol (625 ILCS 5/11--501(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2000)), driving while his license was suspended (625 ILCS 5/6--303(a) (West 2000)), and disobeying a traffic-control device. While defendant's ticket indicates that disobeying a traffic-control device is a violation of section 11--306 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) (625 ILCS 5/11--306 (West 2000)), disobeying a traffic-control device is actually a violation of section 11--305(a) (625 ILCS 5/11--305(a) (West 2000)), which provides that a driver shall obey the instructions of a traffic-control device. Section 11--306, in turn, frames section 11--305(a) by providing the instructions for various traffic-control devices. 625 ILCS 5/11--306 (West 2000). Because of the nature of this case, however, this distinction is irrelevant. Defendant moved to quash his arrest and suppress evidence. The trial court denied the motion. Following a stipulated bench trial, the court found defendant guilty of all three offenses and sentenced him to two years' probation. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We affirm.
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the arresting officer testified that, while on routine patrol, he encountered a vehicle operated by defendant that was stopped at a red light on Washington Street in Naperville. Defendant was in the left lane and the officer was stopped directly behind him. When the light turned green, defendant's vehicle remained at a standstill. After three vehicles in the adjacent lane proceeded through the intersection, the officer activated his vehicle's emergency lights. The officer testified that, at this point, approximately 20 seconds had elapsed since the light had turned green. Defendant then proceeded through the intersection and pulled over.
Defendant emerged from the vehicle, and the officer observed him swaying slightly. The officer testified that he detected the odor of alcohol on defendant's breath. In addition, defendant's eyes were glassy and his speech was slurred. Defendant admitted that he had been drinking that evening. With defendant's consent, the officer administered field sobriety tests. According to the officer, defendant's performance was unsatisfactory and the officer placed defendant under arrest.
In support of his motion, defendant contended that his "brief" delay in proceeding after the light turned green did not constitute disobeying a traffic-control device. The trial court denied the motion, and defendant moved for reconsideration. In denying the motion for reconsideration, the trial court stated that defendant's conduct violated section 11--1303(a) of the Code (625 ILCS 5/11--1303(a) (West 2000)), which prohibits stopping, standing, or parking in specified places. Following a stipulated bench trial, defendant was found guilty of the charged offenses. This appeal followed.
In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, we will accord great deference to the trial court's factual findings, and reverse those findings only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d 425, 431 (2001). However, we review de novo the ultimate legal question of probable cause or reasonable suspicion. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d at 431.
Defendant argues that the arresting officer had no justification to stop him because his "brief" or "momentary" delay in proceeding through the intersection did not constitute disobeying a traffic-control signal under the Code. This argument presents a question of statutory construction. The primary rule of statutory
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