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State v. Hughes12/31/2003
en he collided with another vehicle, killing two of its passengers. Spence was nineteen years old and was under the influence of alcohol.
Considering the above cases, I conclude that the trial court abused its discretion. Alcohol was not a factor in this case, as in Gregrich, Clark, Jackson, Bailey, and Spence. The Defendant, Ms. Hughes, has an unblemished criminal record, unlike the defendants in Clark and Jackson. Yet, in all of these cases, the defendants received less than the maximum sentence. Here, the Defendant was charged with and pled guilty to negligent homicide. She received no benefit from her plea bargain.
The imposition of a maximum sentence under the circumstances of this case is in derogation of the well-settled jurisprudential rule that a maximum sentence is reserved for the worst type of offender and the most serious violation of the offense. Indeed, the five year maximum "makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeful and needless imposition of pain and suffering." State v. Wilson, 96-1392, p. 3 (La. 12/13/96), 685 So.2d 1063, 1065, citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909 (1976).
Our decision today effectively transforms the sentence for an offense with a range of penalties to a minimum mandatory sentence. The majority justifies its decision by a platitudinous reference to the "broad sentencing discretion" of a trial court. True, a trial court has such discretion, but that discretion must be supported by sound legal and factual bases. There is no support for the majority's conclusion today, except for a reference to the trial court's consideration of the factors in La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1. Is the articulation of these factors the only thing that is necessary to immunize a sentence from effective review by an appellate court? Apparently so. The majority recognizes the existence of cases where the circumstances were far more egregious than this case. Yet, it refuses to discuss them, I suspect, because it cannot reconcile this sentence with the sentences in those cases Gregrich, Clark, Jackson, Bailey, and Spence, cannot justify the disproportionality of the sentence in this case with these cases, or simply does not think proportionality is a relevant factor in assessing whether a trial court's discretion has been abused. In so doing, it has effectively foreclosed any meaningful appellate review of sentences. We have, in reality, abdicated our responsibility as an appellate court.
My views are not meant to deprecate the harm done to Mr. Busby's family nor is it meant to condone the inexcusable conduct of the Defendant. I have carefully reviewed the record and my position is consistent with precedent and established jurisprudential tenets. Furthermore, I have reviewed the Pre-Sentence Investigation report which demonstrates a lack of any juvenile or adult criminal record and a showing of genuine remorse by the Defendant. Indisputably, her actions were fatal to Mr. Busby; however, her reckless driving was intended as an act of suicide, albeit unsuccessful. Finally, we should not ignore the level of support the Defendant received from friends, family members, and community and church leaders. Clearly, this case is not one where the "worst type of offender" is involved. Consequently, the legislature provided a range within which to fit an offender such as Ms. Hughes, a range which does not warrant the maximum term.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
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