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Hanson v. Director11/17/2003
AFFIRMED.
[ ] Melissa Hanson is appealing a South Central Judicial District Court judgment affirming an administrative suspension of her driving privileges for driving under the influence of alcohol. Hanson argues that reasonable, articulable suspicion did not exist for an investigative stop of her vehicle. Because the evidence supports the hearing officer's conclusion that the arresting officer had reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop Hanson's vehicle, we affirm.
I.
[ ] On December 29, 2002, at approximately 12:00 a.m., Officer Norman Ruud stopped Hanson while she was driving on I-94. After Hanson failed the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, the ABC test, and the Breathalyzer test, Ruud arrested her for driving under the influence of alcohol. Hanson agreed to submit to a blood test, which indicated her blood alcohol concentration had been .12 percent by weight within two hours after Ruud stopped her vehicle. Hanson was notified of the Department of Transportation's intent to suspend her driving privileges.
[ ] An administrative hearing was held on February 4, 2003. The officer testified that he was traveling eastbound on I-94 and observed Hanson's vehicle weaving on the roadway. Ruud estimated the vehicle was about a quarter of a mile ahead. He testified that he then increased his speed to observe Hanson more closely and saw the vehicle cross over the broken white dividing line. He activated his video camera in the patrol car and observed the vehicle cross over the line a second time before it pulled onto the off-ramp at exit 159. Ruud activated his lights as Hanson was exiting the interstate. Ruud approached the vehicle and smelled the odor of alcohol coming from inside.
[ ] The hearing officer concluded that although slight weaving would not have been enough to have stopped Hanson's vehicle, the evidence showed the weaving was more than slight and therefore Ruud had a sufficient basis for stopping it. She concluded Hanson's vehicle was weaving not only within its lane, but also onto the dividing line. The hearing officer also concluded Ruud had reasonable grounds to believe Hanson had been driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of N.D.C.C. * 39-08-01. The hearing officer suspended Hanson's driving privileges for one year.
[ ] Hanson appealed the administrative decision to the district court. The district court issued its memorandum opinion and order on April 16, 2003, affirming the administrative decision. The judgment was entered on April 28, 2003.
[ ] The district court had jurisdiction under N.D. Const. art. VI, § 8, and N.D.C.C. § 27-05-06. The appeal was timely under N.D.R.App.P. 4(a). This Court has jurisdiction under N.D. Const. art. VI, §§ 2 and 6, and N.D.C.C. §§ 28-27-01 and 28-27-02.
II.
[ ] "We review an administrative suspension of a driver's license under N.D.C.C. ch. 28-32, the Administrative Agencies Practice Act." Isaak v. Sprynczynatyk, 2002 ND 64, * 10, 642 N.W.2d 860. "This Court exercises a limited review in appeals involving drivers' license suspensions or revocations." Henderson v. Director, N. D. Dep't of Transp., 2002 ND 44, * 6, 640 N.W.2d 714. On appeal, we review the administrative agency's decision. Rist v. N.D. Dep't of Transp., 2003 ND 113, * 6, 665 N.W.2d 45. We give deference to the administrative agency's findings and will not make independent findings or substitute our judgment for that of the agency. Sonsthagen v. Sprynczynatyk, 2003 ND 90, * 7, 663 N.W.2d 161. We instead determine only whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have concluded the findings were supported by the weight of the evidence from the entire record. Id. Our review
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