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Bruckner v. Civil Service Commission of Douglas County10/7/2003
avior that clearly endangers persons and property. Therefore, Offense 17(a) would not be the appropriate standard as Bruckner argues.
Finally, although the record does not indicate whether Bruckner was ever convicted of the second-offense DUI, it does show that he lost his driver's license as a result of the citation. See McPherrin v. Conrad, 248 Neb. 561, 537 N.W.2d 498 (1995) (explaining administrative license revocation upon arresting officer's sworn statement). A driver's license is needed, according to Dunning, for Bruckner to perform his duties as a corrections officer. Thus, Bruckner's termination of employment for a second-offense DUI was neither arbitrary nor capricious. There is competent evidence to support the conclusion that Bruckner's actions violated Offense 14, thereby justifying the termination of his employment.
Due Process resulting in frequent zero scores for "dependability." This evidence refutes, in part, Bruckner's contentions that he was an exemplary employee . Consideration of sick leave abuse did not violate Bruckner's due process rights, because he opened up the matter of his alleged "exemplary" employee status and the appraisals he offered revealed that such was not necessarily the case when his use of sick leave was considered.
Finally, a pretermination procedure functions only as "an initial check against mistaken decisions--essentially, a determination of whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the charges against the employee are true and support the proposed action." Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 545-46, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed. 2d 494 (1985). The pretermination process need not resolve the propriety of the discharge. Id. All process that is due is provided by a pretermination opportunity to respond, coupled with post-termination procedures. Id. See, also, Unland v. City of Lincoln, 247 Neb. 837, 530 N.W.2d 624 (1995). As stated previously, DCC charged Bruckner with a second-offense DUI and scheduled a predisciplinary hearing regarding that charge. Bruckner does not deny that this was his second DUI offense and that he did have an opportunity to respond to the charges at the predisciplinary hearing. Since Bruckner does not deny the charge of DUI, "there are reasonable grounds to believe that the charges against the employee are true and support the proposed action." See Loudermill, supra. Furthermore, post-termination procedures were in place so that Bruckner could appeal DCC's decision to the Commission, and then to the district court.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, we hold that there is competent evidence, based on the record, that Bruckner's actions violated Offense 14 and General Rule 6-97(F). Furthermore, we hold that Bruckner's due process rights under the 14th Amendment were not violated. The district court's order is affirmed, and Bruckner's termination of employment is sustained.
Affirmed.
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