 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Commonwealth v. Ogrod12/30/2003
e.
This appears to be an issue of first impression in Pennsylvania. Other jurisdictions, however, have determined that a ruling on interlocutory appeal by a state's intermediate appellate court does not preclude the state's highest court from merits review of the same issue once the order becomes final. See, e.g., Raven v. Board of Comm'rs of Wayne County, 250 N.W.2d 477, 478 n.1 (Mich. 1977). Such a conclusion comports with sound logic, as an intermediate court of appeals should not possess authority to bind a court of last resort within the same proceeding, particularly where the latter court's plenary review of the trial court's final order represents the first instance in which it undertakes consideration of any aspect of the trial-level proceedings. See Commonwealth v. Starr, 541 Pa. 564, 574, 664 A.2d 1326, 1331 (1995) (indicating that, under the law of the case doctrine, "a court involved in the later phases of a litigated matter should not reopen questions decided by another judge of that same court or by a higher court in the earlier phases of the matter" (emphasis added)).
However, upon review of Appellant's double jeopardy claim, we do not find that his rights have been violated. Indeed, in this case, declaring a mistrial was manifestly necessary. The jury repeatedly and expressly told Judge Stout that it was unable to reach a unanimous verdict. A jury must be unanimous in its determination of whether a defendant is guilty or innocent. PA. CONST. art. I, § 6. We agree with the decisions of Judge Stout, the Superior Court, and the U.S. District Court that declaring a mistrial was manifestly necessary. We also agree that Appellant should not be heard to object to the mistrial where, as here, his attorney requested it the day before. For these reasons, the retrial did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States or Pennsylvania Constitutions.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Appellant raises numerous claims of ineffective assistance of counsel relative to many of his substantive issues, including a claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the mistrial that the trial court granted, as described above. In Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726 (Pa. 2002), this Court determined as a general rule that new counsel should wait for Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541 - 9546, proceedings to raise claims of the ineffectiveness of his or her predecessor counsel. However, in Commonwealth v. Bomar, 826 A.2d 831, 853-855 (Pa. 2003), we recognized an exception to that general rule where the trial court has already addressed the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel that the defendant raises on direct appeal. In the instant matter Appellant raised his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel to the trial court on post-trial motions. The trial court conducted a hearing on the ineffectiveness issues at which counsel testified and issued an opinion rejecting those claims. Therefore, they are ripe for our review.
We discuss the ineffective assistance of counsel claims as they arise, but note here the general principles governing such claims. "To prevail on a claim that counsel was constitutionally ineffective, the appellant must overcome the presumption of competence by showing that: (1) his underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) the particular course of conduct pursued by counsel did not have some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his interests; and (3) but for counsel's ineffectiveness, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the challenged proceeding would have been different." Id. at 855. The claim of Appellant that counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to object to t
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 Pennsylvania DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|