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People v. Nettles1/26/2004
s got [you]" and defendant responded, "[I]f I'm so drunk, why did [you] crash and [I] didn't?"
Defendant was charged with willfully attempting to evade a peace officer's vehicle, as to which it was also alleged he drove with willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons and property (§ 2800.2, subd. (a)--count one); driving under the influence (§ 23152, subd. (a)--count two); driving while having a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent or more and willfully refusing to submit to a chemical test (§§ 23152, subd. (b), 23577, 23612--count three); and driving on a suspended license (§ 14601.1, subd. (a)-- count four).
Defendant's theory of defense was mistaken identity. He argued his Cadillac was not the one chased by Officers Goodwin and Glaser by emphasizing the officers' (asserted) inability to describe the hair or face of the driver of the pursued car, and suggesting he was just one of a number of Black men in Oak Park who drive similar cars.
To support the two-car theory, a private investigator testified for the defense that the distance between where Officers Goodwin and Glaser lost sight of the car and where defendant was apprehended was a little over a mile; defense counsel argued from this evidence that defendant's car could not have traveled that distance in the moments before he was apprehended by the sheriff's deputy. Defendant also underscored the fact that Officers Goodwin and Glaser never reported the license plate light of the pursued Cadillac was defective, while defendant's car had a broken license plate light.
DISCUSSION
I. Defendant's Evidentiary Stipulation Regarding Driving Under the Influence Was Knowing and Intelligent
Defendant challenges the validity of his evidentiary stipulation that he drove under the influence with a blood-alcohol content above 0.08 percent, and urges this court to reverse his convictions on counts two and three. We decline.
A. The Stipulation and Related Instructions Regarding Intoxication
At the close of the prosecution's case, the following stipulation was read to the jury:
"[The][p]arties in this action agree to the following:
"On June 30th, 2001, at approximately 2:43 a.m., Mr. Nettles was driving a 1978 gray Cadillac, license number 4NVJ689 on 53rd Street, and was stopped by Deputy Gooler.
"Mr. Nettles chose not to give a blood or breath sample in violation of the Vehicle Code.
"At approximately 4:15 a.m. on 6/30/01, Nurse Kathy Thibeau ..., took blood in a medically approved manner from Mr. Nettles during a nonconsensual blood draw. The blood sample was delivered to the Sacramento County Crime Laboratory.
*3 "Mr. Nettles'[s] blood was tested in a scientifically approved manner to determine the blood-alcohol content of Mr. Nettles'[s] blood. The blood test revealed that Mr. Nettles had a blood-alcohol content of 0.13 percent.
"The parties stipulate that Mr. Nettles was under the influence of alcohol and had a blood-alcohol content above 0.08 percent at the time he was driving his vehicle on 53rd [Street]." [FN3]
FN3. The trial testimony referred to 53rd Street but this segment of the stipulation read to the jury referred to 53rd Avenue, apparently in error.
The jury was instructed that, "if the attorneys stipulate or agree to a fact, you must regard that fact as conclusively proved." It was further instructed, as to count two (driving while under the influence), that the prosecution must prove two elements: that "[a] person drove a vehicle" and "[a]t the time, the driver was under the influence of any alcoholic beverage." As to count three (driving with a blood-alcohol content of 0.08 percent or greater), the jury was instructed that the prosecution must prove two elements: that "[a] person drove a vehicle" and "[a]t the time, the driver had 0
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