People v. Nettles1/26/2004
.08 [percent] or more, by weight, of alcohol in his blood."
Finally, the jury was instructed: "In the crimes charged in Counts Two, Three, and Four, namely, driving under the influence, driving with a blood-alcohol of 0.08 percent or more, and driving on a suspended or revoked license, there must exist a union or joint operation of act or conduct and general criminal intent. General intent does not require an intent to violate the law. When a person intentionally does that which the law declares to be a crime, he is acting with general criminal intent, even though he may not know that his act or conduct is unlawful."
B. Analysis
Defendant contends his stipulation was invalid because it was unaccompanied by advisements and waivers of his constitutional rights to silence, confrontation and cross-examination, and jury trial, i.e., by Boykin-Tahl advice and waivers. (Boykin, supra, 395 U.S. 238 [23 L.Ed.2d 274]; Tahl, supra, 1 Cal.3d 122.)
In Boykin, the United States Supreme Court held it was error "for the trial judge to accept petitioner's guilty plea without an affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary." (Boykin, supra, 395 U.S. at p. 242 [23 L.Ed.2d at p. 279].) In Tahl, the California Supreme Court held that, pursuant to Boykin, a defendant must be advised of the right to a jury trial, the right to confront adverse witnesses and the right against self-incrimination, and an express waiver of these rights must be obtained before his guilty plea is accepted. (Tahl, supra, 1 Cal.3d at pp. 132-133.) The prophylactic Boykin-Tahl requirements are no longer limited to pleas of guilty. (People v. Adams (1993) 6 Cal.4th 570, 576.) But courts only require these advisements to be given in circumstances "tantamount to a plea of guilty," such as an agreement to submit the case on the record of the preliminary hearing (a "slow plea"), or an admission of an allegation made in the information for the purpose of enhancing punishment. (Ibid.; citing In re Mosley (1970) 1 Cal.3d 913, 927, and In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857, 860.)
*4 Because Boykin-Tahl advisements must be given in circumstances which are "tantamount to a plea of guilty," they need not accompany a defendant's evidentiary stipulation if the stipulation contains some, but not all, of the elements necessary to the imposition of punishment. (People v. Adams, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 573, 576.) "When a defendant who has asserted and received his right to trial, and has waived none of his constitutional rights, elects to stipulate to one or more, but not all, of the evidentiary facts necessary to a conviction of an offense or to imposition of additional punishment on finding that an enhancement allegation is true, the concerns which prompted the Boykin holding are not present." (Id. at p. 581; People v.. Newman (1999) 21 Cal.4th 413, 415.)
Defendant argues his stipulation was tantamount to a guilty plea on the driving while intoxicated charges because he stipulated "to all the elements required to establish violations of" counts two and three; under these circumstances, defendant concludes, the trial court's failure to give Boykin-Tahl advisements constitutes prejudicial error.
The Attorney General responds that defendant's stipulation failed to include all the elements of the offenses related to driving while intoxicated, because the stipulation contained nothing regarding criminal intent. He relies for this argument on People v. Gaul-Alexander (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 735 (Gaul-Alexander ), in which the Court of Appeal held that a defendant charged with bigamy need not be given Boykin-Tahl advisements prior to stipulating that, when she allegedly married one man, she was already legally married to another. In so doing, the court in Gaul-Alexander accepted the prosec
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