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Monas v. State10/12/2004
Following a bench trial, Despina P. Monas appeals her convictions for DUI-less safe and obstruction of a police officer, contending that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict; and (2) the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress certain evidence because (a) she did not understand her implied consent rights, (b) the State allegedly destroyed certain exculpatory evidence, and (c) her stop was pretextual. As all of these contentions are patently erroneous, we affirm.
1. Monas contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. We disagree.
On appeal from a criminal conviction, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, and the defendant no longer enjoys the presumption of innocence; moreover, an appellate court does not weigh the evidence or determine witness credibility but only determines whether the evidence is sufficient under the standard of Jackson v. Virginia. [FN1] Conflicts in the testimony of the witnesses, including the State's witnesses, [are] a matter of credibility for the [trier of fact] to resolve. As long as there is some competent evidence, even though contradicted, to support each fact necessary to make out the State's case, the ... verdict will be upheld. The testimony of a single witness is generally sufficient to establish a fact.
(Footnote omitted.) Phagan v. State. [FN2]
Viewed in this light, the record shows that, in the middle of the night on July 14, 1999, Corporal Nathan Davis observed Monas staggering around her vehicle which she had parked in the middle of a public street. Monas then entered a car and began driving. Corporal Davis followed, and, soon thereafter, Monas stopped in an intersection while the traffic light was green, waited until the light turned red, and then made a left turn. Corporal Davis next witnessed Monas's car weaving, and she put on her brakes at almost every intersection she approached.
At that point, Corporal Davis activated his blue lights, and Monas stopped her car at an angle in the middle of the road. Monas then staggered out of her vehicle, and, at that time, her breath had the strong odor of an alcoholic beverage, her eyes were glassy, her gait was unsteady, and her speech was slurred. Although Monas denied having anything to drink, she consented to an alco-sensor test which gave a positive result for consumption of alcohol.
At that point, Corporal Davis attempted to arrest Monas for DUI; however, she resisted so forcefully that Corporal Davis had to request backup assistance. Once backup had arrived and Monas was placed in the police car, Corporal Davis read Monas's implied consent rights to her and asked her to consent to a state-administered breath test. Monas refused to do so.
This evidence amply supported the verdict against Monas. See Jackson, supra.
2. Monas contends that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress certain evidence on several grounds. Again, we disagree.
*2 In reviewing [the] denial of a motion to suppress or in limine, we apply the following three principles[.] First, when a motion to suppress is heard by the trial judge, that judge sits as the trier of facts. The trial judge hears the evidence, and his findings based upon conflicting evidence are analogous to the verdict of a jury and should not be disturbed by a reviewing court if there is any evidence to support them. Second, the trial court's decision with regard to questions of fact and credibility must be accepted unless clearly erroneous. Third, the reviewing court must construe the evidence most favorably to the upholding of the trial court's findings and judgment.
(Citations, punctuation and emphasis omitted.) Brittian v. State. [FN3]
(a) Monas contends that her refusal to submit to a s
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