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Castro v. State3/24/2004
This is a sentence appeal. On September 10, 1999, Stella G. Castro was arrested for driving while intoxicated after she drove her car 30 miles per hour in reverse on a city street, struck another car, and then slammed into a light pole.
Castro had two prior convictions for driving while intoxicated, one from May 1999 (i.e., four months before), and another from November 1997.
Because of her two prior DWI convictions, Castro was charged with, and ultimately convicted of, felony DWI. She was subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of 120 days' imprisonment. The superior court sentenced Castro to 2 years' imprisonment, but the court suspended all of this prison term except the 120 mandatory days. In other words, Castro essentially received a sentence of 24 months with 20 months suspended.
Castro's probation did not go well. Twice, she absconded from probation supervision. The first time, Castro was gone for nine months; the second time, she was gone for ten months. When Castro absconded the second time, she was facing a probation revocation petition based on her first act of absconding, and (by running away) she violated the third-party custody provision of her bail release from that probation revocation petition. Thus, Castro's second act of absconding constituted a new crime - violation of the conditions of bail release, AS 11.56.757(a).
By the time Castro was recaptured the second time, approximately 3" years had gone by since her original sentencing. Rather than face more probation, Castro chose to renounce probation and ask the superior court to give her a flat-time sentence.
Castro asked the court to impose a sentence of 8 months - i.e., an additional 4 months, over and above the 120 days she had already served. But Superior Court Judge Michael L. Wolverton rejected Castro's sentencing recommendation and instead imposed all of Castro's remaining suspended jail time - i.e., an additional 1 year and 8 months. Thus, Castro has now received a sentence of 2 years to serve for felony DWI.
Even when a defendant rejects probation and asks for a flat-time sentence, the defendant "does not thereby forfeit the right to a sentence that is reasonable under the totality of the circumstances of the case". The sentencing judge must not automatically impose all of the defendant's remaining suspended time, "even if it is clear from the record that the defendant cannot benefit further from probation". Rather, the sentencing judge remains obliged to consider all the circumstances of the case and impose a sentence that is justifiable under the sentencing criteria codified in AS 12.55.005 (the "Chaney" sentencing criteria). However, the sentencing judge can consider both the defendant's violation of probation and the defendant's rejection of further probation, since both of these acts "reflect on an offender's prospects for rehabilitation".
In this appeal, Castro argues that Judge Wolverton ignored his duty to evaluate the totality of the circumstances and to conduct a thoughtful assessment of the Chaney criteria in deciding what sentence to impose. Castro contends that, instead of doing this, Judge Wolverton reflexively revoked all of her previously suspended jail time without particular regard to how much time that was.
The record does not bear out this claim. At the sentencing hearing, Judge Wolverton stated that, in preparation for sentencing, he had "read through [Castro's] file once again, very thoroughly". As explained above, Castro's file reveals that she had three convictions for driving while intoxicated within a two-year period (1997 to 1999). Moreover, Castro's third DWI offense - the present felony - was c
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