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Feland v. State1/22/2004
t has frequently held that it will not address a constitutional argument when the case can be disposed of without doing so. See, e.g., Quinn v. Webb Wheel Prods., 334 Ark. 573, 976 S.W.2d 386 (1998); Foster v. Jefferson County Quorum Court, 321 Ark. 105, 901 S.W.2d 809 (1995); Attwood v. Estate of Attwood, 276 Ark. 230, 633 S.W.2d 366 (1982). In Bell v. Bell, 249 Ark. 959, 462 S.W.2d 837 (1971), the court explained that it would not pass upon constitutional questions when the litigation was disposed of without reaching the constitutional question, "since anything said on this point would be pure dictum[.]"
In State v. Jones, 310 Ark. 585, 839 S.W.2d 184 (1992), we declined to reach a constitutional challenge to one of Blytheville's traffic ordinances, noting that the constitutionality of the ordinance "may be pertinent where guilt or innocence is the issue," but Jones cited no authority that would make such a constitutional challenge "pertinent to probable cause proceedings, the purpose of which is merely to determine whether an officer has reasonable grounds to believe a crime has been committed." Jones, 310 Ark. at 589. Here, Feland's constitutional claims are raised in support of his suppression argument; he does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. Further, as noted above, there was clearly probable cause for the officer to believe Feland had committed a violation of the noise ordinance. Thus, because we can resolve Feland's suppression claim without reaching his constitutional arguments, it is our duty to do so. See Herman Wilson Lumber Co. v. Hughes, 245 Ark. 168, 431 S.W.2d 487 (1968).
Affirmed.
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