State v. Christian3/9/2004
s been an abuse of discretion. State v. Barnes, 232 Conn. 740, 746-47, 657 A.2d 611 (1995). Furthermore, o establish an abuse of discretion, [the defendant] must show that the restrictions imposed upon cross-examination were clearly prejudicial.... State v. Castro, 196 Conn. 421, 426, 493 A.2d 223 (1985). The proffering party bears the burden of establishing the relevance of the offered testimony. Unless such a proper foundation is established, the evidence . . . is irrelevant. . . . State v. Barnes, supra, 747. When the trial court excludes defense evidence that provides the defendant with a basis for cross-examination of the state's witnesses, however, such exclusion may give rise to a claim of denial of the right to confrontation and to present a defense." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ferguson, 260 Conn. 339, 350-51, 796 A.2d 1118 (2002). When defense counsel is permitted to expose to the jury the facts from which it appropriately can draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness, those constitutional rights have been satisfied. State v. Gaynor, 182 Conn. 501, 509, 438 A.2d 749 (1980). With these principles in mind, we turn to the defendant's contentions.
The defendant first claims that the trial court improperly ruled that the proffered testimony was inadmissible extrinsic evidence of a collateral matter. The defendant contends that Bobryk's testimony was relevant and material to the merits of the case, because "[Joan] Christian's bias or motive went to the very core of her testimony . . . ." The state asserts, in response, that the testimony properly was excluded because "the jury had sufficient evidence from which to assess Joan Christian's bias and motivation for testifying against the defendant. Permitting the additional testimony proffered by Bobryk would have unnecessarily complicated the case and unduly distracted the jury's attention from the principal issues before them." We agree with the defendant.
" ross-examination is the principal means by which the credibility of witnesses and the truth of their testimony is tested. State v. Lee, 229 Conn. 60, 69, 640 A.2d 553 (1994). Although only relevant evidence may be elicited through cross-examination; State v. Kelley, 229 Conn. 557, 562, 643 A.2d 854 (1994); vidence tending to show motive, bias or interest of an important witness is never collateral or irrelevant. [Indeed, it] may be . . . the very key to an intelligent appraisal of the testimony of the [witness]. . . . State v. Colton, 227 Conn. 231, 248, 630 A.2d 577 (1993) [on appeal after remand, 234 Conn. 683, 663 A.2d 339 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1140, 116 S. Ct. 972, 133 L. Ed. 2d 892 (1996)]. Accordingly, cross-examination to elicit facts tending to show that a witness' testimony was motivated by bias may not be unduly restricted. Id., 249; see also State v. Francis, 228 Conn. 118, 123, 635 A.2d 762 (1993). Bias may consist of a friendly feeling or of hostility. It may be shown in a variety of ways. State v. Asherman, 193 Conn. 695, 719, 478 A.2d 227 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1050, 105 S. Ct. 1749, 84 L. Ed. 2d 814 (1985)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Chance, 236 Conn. 31, 58, 671 A.2d 323 (1996); see also Conn. Code Evid. § 6-5 (" he credibility of a witness may be impeached by evidence showing bias for, prejudice against, or interest in any person or matter that might cause the witness to testify falsely").
In the present case, it is clear that Joan Christian was an important witness for the state. Consequently, evidence of any motive, bias or interest that may have impacted the credibility of her testimony cannot be characterized as collateral or irrelevant. The proffered testimony bore directly on the issu
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