 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
State v. Christian3/9/2004
Under all of the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the constitutional standard of confrontation had been met, and, therefore, that the trial court's improper exclusion of Bobryk's testimony was merely an evidentiary impropriety. " n order to prevail on appeal, the defendant must show that the restrictions imposed by the trial court were harmful. . . . In order to do so, the defendant must establish that the impropriety was so prejudicial as to undermine confidence in the fairness of the verdict ...."(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Clark, supra, 260 Conn. 830. We conclude that the defendant has not satisfied this burden.
The defendant, relying on State v. Colton, supra, 227 Conn. 253-54, contends that the impropriety was harmful because it had a tendency to influence the decision of the jury. In Colton, we concluded that the trial court improperly had excluded evidence that a chief witness for the state had abused illegal drugs and engaged in prostitution, because it was relevant to that witness' interest in receiving a monetary award for testifying against the defendant. Id., 251-52. Wefurther concluded that the impropriety constituted reversible error. Specifically, we stated: "The importance of [the witness'] testimony to the state's case against the defendant cannot be underestimated. The state conceded in its closing argument to the jury that it would have to credit [the witness'] testimony to convict the defendant.... The exclusion of evidence bearing on the motivation of a chief witness for the state, particularly when no other evidence corroborated material aspects of the witness' testimony, is harmful error." (Citation omitted.) Id., 254. In the present case, by contrast, as we already have stated, Joan Christian's testimony concerning the material issue of whether the defendant had been driving at the time of the accident was cumulative of the testimony of three other witnesses. See part I of this opinion. Moreover, the state presented a substantial amount of physical evidence, in addition to the testimony of these witnesses, indicating that the defendant had been the driver. See id. Accordingly, we conclude that the evidentiary impropriety of the trial court was harmless.
III.
Finally, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly excluded from evidence the emergency medical "run sheets" prepared by Ruggiero and Ford. Specifically, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly failed to admit the run sheets either as prior inconsistent statements or under the business records exception to the hearsay rule and, therefore, denied him his constitutional right to present evidence that he was confused and disoriented when he made the incriminating statements to Ruggiero and Ford in the ambulance on the way to the hospital.
The following additional facts are relevant to our resolution of this claim. During the state's case-in-chief, Ruggiero testified on direct examination that she had arrived at the accident scene at approximately 12:55 a.m. on March 18, 2000. At the scene, she made a physical assessment of the defendant, during which she asked him questions concerning the accident. Specifically, Ruggiero asked him if he had been driving and wearing his seat belt, and he answered both questions in the affirmative. The defendant appeared coherent when he answered these questions. During the ambulance ride to the hospital, however, the defendant wavered "between coherent and confused." Ruggiero marked the box labeled "confused" on her run sheet, but she explained that she had done so because "at times, he wasn't really cooperative with answering." Nonetheless, she asked the defendant several times whether he had b
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 Connecticut DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|