 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
State v. Albertson2/11/2004
hospital. He opined that this level of alcohol was unlikely to cause death in an otherwise healthy person in the absence of "some other factor."
While there was evidence that Albertson warned the boys not to mix alcohol and pills and put the pill bottle into a medicine cabinet, a fact-finder was free to accept the State's version of events. See State v. Begey, 672 N.W.2d 747, 750 (Iowa 2003). Similarly, the fact-finder was free to reject Albertson's contention that Kieffer's own conduct caused his demise. Id. As our highest court recently reiterated, a victim's conduct must amount to the sole proximate cause of injury to relieve a defendant of liability. Id.; see also State v. Dalton, ____ N.W.2d ___, ____ (Iowa 2004). The district court reasonably could have found that this standard was not satisfied. Cf. State v. Rohm, 609 N.W.2d 504 (Iowa 2000) (finding evidence sufficient to support involuntary manslaughter conviction where mother supplied large amounts of alcohol to minors and knew it was being consumed by minors).
With respect to the second causation element, "no other rule of law relieves the defendant of liability," Albertson claims she cannot be held liable for restitution because injury or death was not an element of the crime with which she was charged and to which she pled guilty. However, our appellate courts have not imposed this rule of law in restitution cases.
In State v. Starkey, 437 N.W.2d 573, (Iowa 1989) the defendant was charged with leaving the scene of a personal injury accident. He was ordered to pay restitution. Id. at 573-74. On appeal, Starkey argued restitution was inappropriate because the victim's injuries were not caused or exacerbated by his act of leaving the scene, but by the accident itself. The Iowa Supreme Court agreed, finding " he only inference supported by the record is that [the victim's] injuries occurred before Starkey committed the offense with which he was charged...." Id. at 575. The Court did not state that harm to the victim had to be an element of the underlying offense.
In State v. Mai, 572 N.W.2d 168 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997), the defendant was charged with vehicular homicide and operating while intoxicated (OWI) following an accident that resulted in the death of another person. Mai, 572 N.W.2d at 169. A jury acquitted Mai of vehicular homicide, but found him guilty of OWI Id. Mai was ordered to pay restitution. Id. at 169-70. On the causation issue, our court said, " n reaching its verdict, the jury implicitly found [the victim's] death was not caused by Mai's intoxication." Id. at 171. The court went on to conclude that, " ithout further proof, Mai's conviction of driving while intoxicated is not sufficient to meet the State's burden to establish [the victim] died as the result of Mai's criminal conduct and the resulting entitlements to the victim restitution." Id. at 171-72 (emphasis added). This language suggests that restitution may be imposed even if injury or death is not an element of the underlying crime.
We affirm the restitution award.
AFFIRMED.
|