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Coleman v. State6/23/2004
A jury found David P. Coleman guilty of driving while under the influence. [FN1] He appeals, claiming that District Court Judge Raymond M. Funk erred when he allowed the State to introduce evidence that he had been offered an independent chemical test. Coleman also claims that Judge Funk improperly restrained his cross-examination by cautioning him that some of his questioning of a police witness might open the door to admission of evidence that he had been given a preliminary breath test. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
Factual and procedural background
At about 3:00 in the morning on August 9, 2002, a Fairbanks police officer, Sergeant Eric Jewkes, stopped Coleman for a traffic violation. As soon as Jewkes contacted Coleman, he noticed that Coleman's eyes were bloodshot, that he smelled of alcohol, and that his speech was slurred. Jewkes had Coleman step out of his vehicle for field sobriety tests. When Coleman got out, he nearly fell twice, and then had to use his car to balance himself so he could remain standing.
Based on Coleman's various claims of physical impairments, Jewkes decided not to administer any balancing tests. He was also unable to administer the horizontal gaze nystagmus test because Coleman refused to cooperate. Jewkes arrested Coleman for driving under the influence. Sometime during the contact, Coleman was given a preliminary breath test. This test indicated that his blood alcohol content was .155 percent.
After arresting Coleman, Jewkes took him to the Fairbanks Police Station, where a DataMaster test was administered. The DataMaster test indicated that approximately forty minutes after he had been stopped, Coleman's blood alcohol content was .123 percent. During the processing, Jewkes informed Coleman that he had the right to an independent chemical test.
The day before trial, Coleman asked Judge Funk to prevent the State from discussing the offer of the independent chemical test. Coleman provided no specific grounds supporting his motion; instead, he reminded Judge Funk that he had earlier excluded this evidence in an unrelated case. Judge Funk denied Coleman's request, and ruled that the State could show that Coleman was offered the test.
Trial started the next day. Sergeant Jewkes was the only witness. The State played an audiotape of Jewkes advising Coleman of his right to an independent chemical test. When the State offered this audiotape in evidence, Coleman objected--without any elaboration--on Miranda [FN2] grounds. He also objected to the State's offer of the document that informed Coleman of this right. The audiotape and the document were admitted.
FN2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
Soon after, Coleman cross-examined Sergeant Jewkes. Jewkes agreed with Coleman that an independent test, had one been done, could have been relevant with respect to the DataMaster results. He also agreed that if the two tests are administered close in time, a comparison of their results is more useful. But when Coleman then asked, "[S]ince you've already indicated to us that this DataMaster is just a point in space, we don't know if a person's going up or going down or being flat, you would agree also that ....", the State objected.
*2 The State argued that this line of questioning was misleading because there was another test result available--the preliminary breath test--that suggested that Coleman's blood alcohol content was higher before the DataMaster test. The State claimed that if the issue was whether Coleman's blood alcohol content was going up or down at the time of the DataMaster test, then the preliminary breath test result should be admitted. But Coleman's attorney said, "No, that's not where I'm going. W
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