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People v. Cosenza2/11/2004
al proceedings, such as the speedy trial statute, are applicable in civil proceedings, such as summary suspensions, and our research has found no such authority. Furthermore, in Schaefer, our supreme court held that it is the State's burden, not the petitioner's, to set a timely date for hearing the petition to rescind the summary suspension. Schaefer, 154 Ill. 2d 250, 609 N.E.2d 329. Under Schaefer, we will not require the petitioner to assume the scheduling burden which our supreme court has ruled is the State's obligation.
In the present case, the 30-day statutory period commenced on November 14, 2002, when Cosenza filed his petition; it expired on December 14, 2002. The hearing began on December 2, a date within 30-days. However, the court continued the matter to December 17, a date beyond the 30-days. The record does not reflect that the delay "was occasioned by the defendant." Schaefer, 154 Ill. 2d at 262. Thus, following the analysis in Schaefer, we conclude that the State was responsible for making certain that the matter was rescheduled within the 30-day period.
The State also claims that because the original hearing commenced in a timely manner, the statutory requirements are met. Again we must disagree with the State's position. Under the plain language of the statute, the hearing is to be "conducted" within the 30-day period (625 ILCS 5/2--118.1(b) (West 2002)). Schaefer states that the hearing is to be "held" within this time period. 154 Ill. 2d 250, 609 N.E.2d 329. See also People v. Ribar, 336 Ill. App. 3d 462, 783 N.E.2d 1098 (2003); People v. Fitterer, 322 Ill. App. 3d 820, 751 N.E.2d 174 (2001). Under the statute and under Schaefer, we cannot say that the hearing in this case was "conducted" or "held" merely because it was commenced.
The legislature's intent in enacting the rescission provisions was to resolve the matter expeditiously. Rescission proceedings are to be conducted quickly to ensure that the interests of both the State and the petitioner are protected. The State's interest is assured by swiftly removing impaired drivers from our roadways. The petitioner's interest is assured by allowing him the prompt exercise of both his due process rights and the opportunity to regain his driving privileges. People v. Rodriguez, 339 Ill. App. 3d 677, 791 N.E.2d 707 (2003).
Merely beginning the hearing in a timely manner does not fulfill the legislature's intent to resolve the matter expeditiously. See Rodriguez, 339 Ill. App. 3d 677, 791 N.E.2d 707; People v. Moore, 138 Ill. 2d 162, 561 N.E.2d 648 (1990). We hold that the trial court erred as a matter of law by denying Cosenza's petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension of his driver's license.
Because of this ruling, we need not reach the other issue raised by Cosenza in this appeal.
We reverse the judgment of the Kankakee County circuit court denying Cosenza's petition for rescission of his statutory summary suspension.
Reversed.
BARRY, J., and HOLDRIDGE, PJ., concurring.
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