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State v. Boone1/30/2004
bility of parole in 20 years and a consecutive term of 72 months' imprisonment.
1. Sufficiency of evidence regarding aggravated arson and first-degree felony murder
The defendant advances the following two arguments:
(1) The defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence to establish that the property damaged was one in which another person had any interest, an essential element of aggravated arson. He acknowledges that "any interest" may include a leasehold interest but argues the arson investigator's testimony that Eads was a "renter" was insufficient to show a leasehold interest as a matter of law. See State v. Rodriguez, 269 Kan. 633, 635, 8 P.3d 712 (2000) ("The words 'any interest' cover more than just a 'fee simple interest' and include, for example, a leaseholder's interest in real property." ).
(2) The State failed to prove he aided or abetted in the aggravated arson in that there was insufficient evidence that he intentionally promoted or assisted in the commission of aggravated arson or that the aggravated arson was reasonably foreseeable from the crime of aggravated burglary or aggravated robbery. He argues the State did not prove that he was ever in Eads' home, that he knowingly participated in or was aware of the arson, that he knew what happened to Eads, or that it was reasonably foreseeable that Steward would burn down the house.
When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a criminal case, the standard of review is whether, after review of all the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the appellate court is convinced that a rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Beach, 275 Kan. 603, Syl. 2, 67 P.3d 121 (2003).
(A) Aggravated arson element of damaging a building in which another person has any interest
The defendant was charged with aggravated arson, defined as knowingly, by means of fire or explosive, damaging any building or property which is a dwelling in which another person has any interest without the consent of such other person, and committed upon a building or property in which there is a human being. (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 21-3719(a). In amending the arson statute from "property of another person" to the present statute using the words "any interest," our legislature intended to expand the types of property interest protected by the arson statute. State v. Johnson, 12 Kan. App. 2d 239, 242, 738 P.2d 872, rev. denied 242 Kan. 905 (1987). Johnson concluded that "any interest" includes a leasehold interest in real property. 12 Kan. App. 2d at 243.
Black's Law Dictionary 890 (6th ed. 1990) defines leasehold as " n estate in real property held by lessee/tenant under a lease. The four principal types of leasehold estates are the estate for years, periodic tenancy, tenancy at will, and tenancy at sufferance. The asset representing the right of the lessee to use leased property." Sufferance is defined as " oleration; negative permission by not forbidding; passive consent; license implied from the omission or neglect to enforce an adverse right." Black's Law Dictionary 1432.
The defendant argues that an oral contract to lease realty for more than a year is void under the statute of frauds, citing K.S.A. 33-105, which provides that " o leases . . . exceeding one year in duration, shall at any time hereafter be assigned or granted, unless it be by deed or note, in writing, signed by the party so assigning or granting the same." See Daniel v. Leben, 188 Kan. 344, 348-49, 362 P.2d 634 (1961). In order to prove that Eads had a leasehold interest in the damaged building, the defendant
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