City of Broussard v. Watkins3/31/2004
by removing the driving privileges of those who have been convicted of driving while intoxicated." Id. at 796.
In State v. Sonnier, 95-1103 (La.App. 3 Cir. 8/28/96), 679 So.2d 1011, we were asked to determine whether prosecuting someone for driving while intoxicated after their driving privileges had been administratively suspended constituted double jeopardy. In our opinion, we wrote:
[United States v.] Ursery [518 U.S. 267, 116 S.Ct. 2135 (1996)] reaffirmed and adopted the analytical framework announced in United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 104 S.Ct. 1099, 79 L.Ed.2d 361 (1984). A two-part test is used. First, are the proceedings intended to be criminal or civil in nature? Second, are the proceedings so punitive in form and effect as to render them criminal, despite legislative intent to the contrary? To satisfy the latter prong of the two-part test, the "clearest proof" is necessary to show that the sanction is criminal and not civil. Ursery, U.S. at , 116 S.Ct. at 2147-48.
The answer to the initial inquiry is simple. Butler stated that "a driver's license suspension is a civil, not punitive, measure." Id. at 795. Having so concluded, where, then, is the "clearest proof" that the suspension proceedings may not legitimately be viewed as civil in nature and that they are, in fact, criminal ? We have examined the record and the statutes, La.R.S. 32:667 and 668, and have not discerned the existence of that "clearest proof." Ursery does not lend guidance to what constitutes "clearest proof." Like Ursery, however, we have to admit that ". . . the fact that a [driver's license suspension] has some connection to a criminal violation is far from the 'clearest proof' necessary to show that a proceeding is criminal." Id. at , 116 S.Ct. at 2149.
The defendants submit attractive arguments which suggest that these suspension proceedings are not remedial and are the functional equivalent of a criminal proceeding. For example, La.R.S. 32:667 and 668 permit one who transgresses the statutory provisions to drive under a temporary permit for a period not exceeding thirty days and to obtain a restricted license once certain conditions are met. Additionally, under La.R.S. 32:415.1, a transgressor may also be eligible for an economic hardship license. The proceedings, the defendants argue, therefore, do not accomplish the objective of removing an intoxicated driver from the state's highways. Certainly, these are punitive effects. However, while having certain punitive aspects, La.R.S. 32:667 and 668 "serve important non-punitive goals." Ursery, U.S. at , 116 S.Ct. at 2148. (See Butler, 609 So.2d at 792, 796-797 for a discussion of these non-punitive goals). These effects, while punitive, are not the "clearest proof" necessary to show that these proceedings are criminal in nature.
Id. at 1012-13 (footnote omitted).
Likewise, contempt proceedings are considered civil, if the intent of the court is to coerce a defendant into obeying an order, and criminal if the intent is to punish the defendant. See Dauphine v. Carencro High School, 02-2005 (La. 4/21/03), 843 So.2d 1096.
In March 1995, the City of Broussard adopted Ordinance No. 144, which prohibits "exotic, nude, semi-nude and topless dancing" at businesses required to hold an alcoholic beverage permit. The penalties for violations range from a fifteen day suspension of the "Certificate of Qualification and the permits required by Ordinance No. 84, as they apply to alcohol beverage permits" to revocation of the certificate and permits depending on the number of "conviction ."
The purpose of the ordinance is to promote the protection of the citizens
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