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City of Broussard v. Watkins3/31/2004
and to maintain peace, which could be both a civil and criminal objective; however, violators suffer no loss of liberty, incarceration, or fine. In that regard, these proceeding are civil in nature. Further, we are guided by La.R.S. 33:4785(A) (footnotes omitted), which states:
Any municipality may suspend or revoke within the corporate limits and any police jury or other governing authority of a parish may suspend or revoke within the limits of the parish, permits issued to retail dealers in beverages having an alcoholic content of more than six percent by volume for causes set forth in R.S. 26:88, 26:89; and may suspend or revoke permits issued to such retail dealers in beverages having an alcoholic content of not more than six percent by volume for causes set forth in R.S. 26:285, 26:286.
The causes set forth in La.R.S. 26:90 and 26:286 encompass the type of activity prohibited by the City of Broussard's ordinance. Review of cases in which a permit has been suspended or revoked is provided for in La.R.S. 33:4788, which reads:
The holder of the permit who is aggrieved by a decision of the governing body of the municipality or parish or a municipal alcoholic beverage control board to suspend or revoke his permit, may within ten days of the notification of the decision take a devolutive appeal to the district court having jurisdiction of his place of business and on such appeal the trial shall be de novo. Within ten calendar days from the signing of the judgment by the district court the municipality or parish governing authority, a municipal alcoholic beverage control board or the holder of the permit, as the case may be, may devolutively appeal from the judgment of the district court to the court of appeals as in ordinary civil cases.
Accordingly, this matter shall proceed as a civil appeal.
TRIAL DE NOVO
Watkins claims the district court should have granted him a trial de novo as required by La.R.S. 13:1896. The City contends Watkins stipulated to the facts in the magistrate's court and never requested a trial on the merits either in the magistrate court or the district court. The City additionally notes that Watkins did not object to the district court issuing a ruling on the record and that he actually prepared the judgment for the district court's signature. The City also argues that the only defenses involved legal issues and Watkins offered no facts which were not contained in the record. Finally, the City argues Watkins, who claims he is not the license holder, will suffer no loss as a result of the conviction because he has no license to suspend.
We find that, under either La.R.S. 13:1896 or 33:4788, Watkins was entitled to a trial de novo by the district court. La.R.S. 13:1896 requires appeals from mayor's court and justice of the peace courts to be tried de novo, but this is not a statutory requirement for appeals of city, parish, and municipal court judgments. The minutes indicate the matter was heard by the Broussard Magistrate Court and the order for appeal to the district court is signed by Carol Spell, Magistrate Judge. Accordingly, the Broussard Magistrate Court is a mayor's court. See La.Code Crim.P. art. 931; La.R.S. 33:441; La.R.S. 33:441.26; and City of Kenner v. Marquis, 98-418 (La.App. 5 Cir. 6/4/98), 715 So.2d 85, writ denied, 98-1806 (La. 10/16/98), 726 So.2d 907.
As additional support for his position that he was entitled to a trial de novo, Watkins cites North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328, 96 S.Ct. 2709 (1976). In North, the Supreme Court held that a two-tier court system in which criminal cases are heard first by a non-lawyer police court judge, when a later trial de novo is available,
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