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Levine v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.3/8/2004
e that the tortfeasor had passed away, Levine believed that she was well within the appropriate statute of limitations for bringing suit for her injuries. I mention these facts not because they bear on the interpretation of the insurance contract or the statute, but rather to refute the implication that the equities operate against Levine.
I accept the Court's conclusion that the language of State Farm's insurance contract denies Levine's coverage, and turn to the issue of whether the policy's language violates the provisions of Maine's uninsured/underinsured vehicle law. We assume that an insurance policy incorporates all the relevant mandatory provisions of the statute pursuant to which the policy was drafted. Skidgell v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 1997 ME 149, 7, 697 A.2d 831, 833. When the provision of a particular insurance policy conflicts with a statutory mandate, however, the statute controls. Id.
Statutory interpretation always begins with the letter of the law. The express language of section 2902 is clear and unambiguous. Title 24-A, section 2902(4) is the statutory provision granting insurance companies only the right to reduce, or subrogate, the compensation they are obligated to pay parties insured under their uninsured motorist coverage. See 24-A M.R.S.A. § 2902(4) (2000). Insurance companies assert this right embodied in section 2902(4) by including "limit reduction clauses" in their uninsured motorist policies. See, e.g., Tibbetts v. Me. Bonding & Cas. Co., 618 A.2d 731, 732 (Me. 1992) ("' amages . . . shall be reduced by all sums . . . aid because of the "bodily injury" by or on behalf of persons . . . who may be legally responsible.'") (quoting the Tibbettses' insurance policy) (emphasis added). However, a limits reduction clause that extends an insurer's subrogation rights beyond that authorized by section 2902(4) is unenforceable. See id. at 734 (holding that an insurance policy's offset provision was unenforceable because section 2902(4) does not authorize a reduction for proceeds received from a fully insured joint tortfeasor); see also Wescott v. Allstate Ins., 397 A.2d 156, 166 (Me. 1979) (" o the extent that policy terms are repugnant to the express or implied requirements of [section 2902(4)], they are void and unenforceable.").
To resolve the present appeal, therefore, one must first ascertain section 2902(4)'s parameters and, second, analyze whether State Farm's limits reduction clause exceeds those parameters. We review the interpretation of section 2902(4), a question of law, de novo. See State v. McLaughlin, 2002 ME 55, 5, 794 A.2d 69, 72. "We look first to the plain meaning of the statutory language as a means of effecting the legislative intent." Coker v. City of Lewiston, 1998 ME 93, 7, 710 A.2d 909, 910. "Unless the statute itself discloses a contrary intent, words in a statute must be given their plain, common, and ordinary meaning, such as [people] of common intelligence would usually ascribe to them." State v. Vainio, 466 A.2d 471, 474 (Me. 1983).
Section 2902(1) requires State Farm to provide uninsured/underinsured vehicle coverage. Section 2902(2) specifies the amount of underinsured and uninsured coverage an insurer must provide. In this case it is undisputed that the State Farm policy provided $100,000 of underinsured motorist coverage. These two subsections establish the extent of State Farm's potential liability.
State Farm asserts that section 2902(4), which it characterizes as a "set off provision," allows it to prospectively limit its coverage to $50,000. Section 2902(4), however, is not a set off provision. Section 2902(4) provides:
In the event of payment to any per
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