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Levine v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.3/8/2004
son under uninsured vehicle coverage, and subject to the terms of such coverage, to the extent of such payment the insurer shall be entitled to the proceeds of any settlement or recovery from any person legally responsible for the bodily injury as to which such payment was made, and to amounts recoverable from the assets of the insolvent insurer of the other motor vehicle.
24-A M.R.S.A. § 2902(4) (emphasis added). The plain language of this subsection merely creates an entitlement on the part of the insurer, to any proceeds that the insured receives from the tortfeasor, in the event, and to the extent that the insured received payment under the policy. This entitlement only operates after the insured has recovered under the policy, and only entitles the insurer to settlement proceeds. Thus, this section prevents an insured from being compensated twice for her or his injuries. This section does not affect the primary liability of the insurer.
The Court interprets this clear statutory language--"the insurer shall be entitled to the proceeds of any settlement or recovery"--to mean that the insurer is entitled to limit its underinsured vehicle coverage based on the prospect of a settlement or recovery. To understand how the Court reaches this interpretation, it is necessary to examine its discussion of the intent behind underinsured vehicle coverage.
The Court spends little time addressing the express language of the statute, preferring to focus on the "entire statutory scheme," the "nature of gap coverage," the "intent of the Legislature," as well as the rule in other states. Even if all of these sources conflict with the actual words in section 2902(4), they are inapplicable in the absence of ambiguous language in the statute. We have consistently held that, when interpreting statutory language, we will not resort to indicia of legislative intent other than the statute itself unless the statute is ambiguous. Home Builders Ass'n of Me. v. Town of Eliot, 2000 ME 82, 4, 750 A.2d 566, 569 ("Only if the statutory language is ambiguous will 'we examine other indicia of legislative intent, such as legislative history.'") (emphasis added) (quoting Coker, 1998 ME 93, 7, 710 A.2d at 910). The Court does not assert that any part of section 2902(4) is ambiguous, and therefore, its plain language must be applied. Because the section merely creates an entitlement in any proceeds or settlement, it does not reduce the extent of State Farm's liability. State Farm's entitlement to settlement proceeds, should such proceeds ever materialize, in no way dilutes its obligation under the statute to insure Levine to the full extent of its underinsured vehicle coverage for bodily injury or death.
The common and ordinary meaning of the phrase "the insurer shall be entitled to the proceeds of any settlement or recovery" indicates our Legislature intended that an insurer's subrogation rights are not triggered until the injured insured receives some type of payment from the party responsible for causing the claimant's bodily injury. See 24-A M.R.S.A. § 2902(4); Tibbetts, 618 A.2d at 734 ("Therefore, the insurer's right of subrogation also applies only to proceeds received from, or on behalf of, the operator of the underinsured vehicle that triggered the insurer's obligation."); accord Deyette v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 703 A.2d 661, 663 (N.H. 1997) ("Recovery by an insured from an underinsured motorist tortfeasor triggers an insurer's right to reduce payment under uninsured motorist coverage, even though the injured insured has not been fully compensated."); Muir v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 522 A.2d 236, 239 (Vt. 1987) ("Section 941(e) [analogous provision to section 2902(4)] applies
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