 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
State v. Fortin2/3/2004
ury. 126 N.J. at 34-35. By prohibiting inquiry about the defendant's prior murder convictions that were certain to be introduced in support of the N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(a) aggravating factor, the court denied both itself and counsel the opportunity to search for impartial jurors who were willing and able to follow the law and the court's instructions. 126 N.J. at 32. Absent that inquiry, neither court nor counsel could exercise for-cause and peremptory strikes "intelligently and effectively." Ibid.
In Moore, supra, another capital case, the defendant was convicted of murdering his pregnant wife and her eighteen-month old son with a hammer. 122 N.J. at 427, 430. At times during jury selection, the trial court resisted the questioning of prospective jurors concerning the victims' status. Id. at 447-48. For example, the court, on occasion, would not permit a response to the question, "Would the fact that one of the victims here was a child influence you so that it would be more likely that you would impose the death penalty?" Id. at 448.
We found nothing improper in asking such a question, and also found that a response indicating a juror was more likely to convict on the basis of a victim's status, if not providing grounds to excuse for cause, might provide a reason for counsel to exercise a peremptory challenge. Ibid. Although we reversed the defendant's convictions on other grounds, we noted that the trial court had "overread" Manley as prohibiting such inquiries, and offered guidance for future capital trial voir dires concerning the impact a victim's status might have on prospective guilt-or penalty-phase jurors. Id. at 446-51. A prospective juror's bias in favor of conviction or the death penalty based on a victim's status, as noted, is a legitimate ground for the exercise of a peremptory challenge. Id. at 448.
We instructed that "open-ended questioning" should be permitted on the issue of victim status "as it relates to any prejudice or predisposition affecting the juror's ability to adjudge fairly in the guilt phase or the ability to consider mitigating evidence in any penalty phase." Id. at 451. Those inquiries need not lead to removal of a juror for cause, but may impel one of the parties to exercise a peremptory challenge. Ibid.
In this case, the holding in Manley does not support the trial court's categorical rejection of inquiry into the jurors' ability to remain fair and impartial and to follow the court's limiting instructions in light of the evidence of defendant's sexual assault of Trooper Gardner. Unlike Manley, in this case, the introduction at trial of that other crime was not a possibility, but a certainty. Indeed, the other-crime evidence was central to the State's case. The success of the prosecution hinged on whether the similarities between the attack on Trooper Gardner and the attack on Padilla established the identity of Padilla's killer. Although we do not approve of all of the language in defendant's proposed voir dire instruction 23af e.g., "I'm going to ask all of you individually what your reaction was to the evidence and the instructions" (emphasis added) 23af the purpose of the requested inquiry was to ferret out juror bias.
Defendant's proposed voir dire was the antithesis of the "hypothetical question" we intended to foreclose in Manley.
There was nothing contingent about the admissibility of the other-crime evidence, and nothing conjectural about its power to evoke a visceral and emotional response from jurors. The trial court's refusal to make any inquiry, much less a searching one, of the other-crime evidence is similar to the constitutionally flawed process we condemned in Biegenwald IV. In that case, the t
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 New Jersey DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|