State v. Fortin2/3/2004
1, 147 L.Ed. 2d at 442.
In assessing whether the legislative scheme comported with the federal constitution, the Court engaged in a historical analysis under the common law.
Any possible distinction between an "element" of a felony offense and a "sentencing factor" was unknown to the practice of criminal indictment, trial by jury, and judgment by court as it existed during the years surrounding our Nation's founding. As a general rule, criminal proceedings were submitted to a jury after being initiated by an indictment containing "all the facts and circumstances which constitute the offence,... stated with such certainty and precision, that the defendant... may be enabled to determine the species of offence they constitute, in order that he may prepare his defense accordingly... and that there may be no doubt as the judgment which should be given, if the defendant be convicted.
[Id. at 478, 120 S.Ct. at 2356, 147 L.Ed. 2d at 448 (quoting J. Archbold, Pleading and Evidence in Criminal Cases 44 (15th ed. 1862)) (footnote omitted).]
It also noted:
"Where a statute annexes a higher degree of punishment to a common-law felony, if committed under particular circumstances, an indictment for the offence, in order to bring the defendant within that higher degree of punishment, must expressly charge it to have been committed under those circumstances, and must state the circumstances with certainty and precision."
[Id. at 480, 120 S.Ct. at 2357, 147 L.Ed. 2d at 449 (quoting Archbold, Pleading and Evidence in Criminal Cases, supra, at 51 (internal citation omitted)).]
As can be seen, the specificity we require in indictments has antecedents in the traditions of our law.
The Apprendi Court held that due process requires that
" ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. at 2362-63, 147 L.Ed. 2d at 455. The Court concluded that " t is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed." Id. at 490, 120 S.Ct. at 2363, 147 L.Ed. 2d at 455 (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 252-53, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 1228, 143 L.Ed. 2d 311, 332 (1999) (Stevens, J., concurring)). The Court emphasized that "the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect 23af does the required finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury's guilty verdict?" Id. at 494, 120 S.Ct. at 2365, 147 L.Ed. 2d at 457.
In Ring, supra, the Supreme Court logically extended its Apprendi holding to strike down Arizona's capital sentencing scheme that allowed a judge alone to make the factual findings required to sentence a defendant to death. 536 U.S. at 588-89, 122 S.Ct. at 2432, 153 L.Ed. 2d at 564. Under Arizona law, the maximum punishment that a defendant could receive based solely on a jury's finding of guilt of first-degree murder was life imprisonment. Id. at 597, 122 S.Ct. at 2437, 153 L.Ed. 2d at 569. That defendant could not be sentenced to death, the statutory maximum penalty for first-degree murder, unless at a hearing the judge found beyond a reasonable doubt at least one aggravating circumstance and then found no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. Id. at 592-93, 122 S.Ct. at 2434-35, 153 L.Ed. 2d at 566.
The Court, in Ring, concluded that the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee made applicable to the States entrus
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 New Jersey DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|