State v. Fortin2/3/2004
). As we observed in State v. Ramseur, supra:
It is clear to us, however, that functionally, the aggravating factors in the Act are indistinguishable, for this purpose, from the elements of a crime. For example, no more or less than premeditation under our prior law, proof of an aggravating factor could mark the difference between imprisonment and death.
[106 N.J. at 201 n.27.]
Before Apprendi and Ring, New Jersey treated aggravating factors as though they were elements of the offense by submitting them to a petit jury and subjecting them to proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Following Ring, today, those procedures are a constitutional imperative. In a constitutional sense, the Arizona capital aggravating factors are indistinguishable from those in New Jersey in the manner in which they operate to elevate a term of imprisonment to a death sentence. For purposes of the Sixth Amendment's jury-trial guarantee, aggravating factors "operate as the functional equivalent of an element of the greater offense.... f murder plus one or more aggravating circumstances." Sattazahn, supra, 537 U.S. at 111, 123 S.Ct. at 739, 154 L.Ed. 2d at 599 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Thus, murder is a distinct lesser-included offense of the greater offense of capital murder. Ibid. After Ring, federal prosecutors in capital prosecutions under the Federal Death Penalty Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3591 - 3598, have submitted to federal grand juries those aggravating factors that make a defendant eligible for the imposition of a sentence of death. They are doing so by obtaining superseding indictments that contain a "Notice of Special Findings" alleging the aggravating factors. See, e.g., United States v. Haynes, 269 F. Supp. 2d 970, 973 (W.D. Tenn. 2003) (noting that, post-Ring, government obtained a superseding indictment alleging aggravating factors); United States v. Sampson, 245 F. Supp. 2d 327, 329 (D. Mass. 2003) (same); United States v. Church, 218 F. Supp. 2d 813, 814 (W.D. Va. 2002) (same); United States v. Matthews, 246 F. Supp. 2d 137, 140 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (same); United States v. Lentz, 225 F. Supp. 2d 672, 675 (E.D. Va. 2002) (same); United States v. Regan, 221 F. Supp. 2d 672, 677 (E.D. Va. 2002) (same). Federal prosecutors apparently have assumed that Ring requires a grand jury to conclude that the government's decision to seek the death penalty is supported by sufficient evidence. The federal experience shows no sign that submission of aggravating factors to the grand jury has impaired law enforcement's ability to prosecute capital cases. The aggravating factors in the federal capital sentencing scheme serve a substantially similar purpose to the aggravating factors under our Capital Penalty Act.
Although we recognize that the Fifth Amendment right to indictment by a grand jury does not apply to the States, Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538, 4 S.Ct. 111, 122, 28 L.Ed. 232, 239 (1884), we have never construed our grand jury provision under Article I, Paragraph 8 as providing lesser protection than its federal analogue. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 215 n.42 (1987); State v. Porro, 152 N.J. Super. 259, 265 (Law Div. 1977), aff'd, 158 N.J. Super. 269 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1047, 99 S.Ct. 724, 58 L.Ed. 2d 706 (1978).
Next, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least one statutory aggravating factor. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3592(b)-(d); 18 U.S.C.A. § 3593(c). Jurors must unanimously agree on the existence of any aggravating factor; in contrast, "any member of the jury who finds the existence of a mitigating factor may consider such factor established... regardless of the number of jurors who concur that the factor has been
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 New Jersey DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|