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State v. Madan1/28/2004
imposition of at least one-third the sentence as a period of parole ineligibility.
If the trial court was commenting on a perceived anomaly of a presumptive term cojoined with a period of parole ineligibility, that is hardly a sufficient basis to reject a plea. Bowens, supra, 108 N.J. at 639; State v. Kruse, 105 N.J. 354, 361-362 (1987).
The court's concluding reference to manslaughter being a crime of the second-degree is a non sequitur in the present context of a plea to first-degree aggravated manslaughter. The final sentence," his is clearly not a manslaughter but an aggravated manslaughter case and the anticipated sentence does not serve the interest of justice," is equally enigmatic. Defendant was pleading to aggravated manslaughter and the sentence was squarely within the range for that first-degree offense.
Essentially, the trial court believed the recommended sentence was too lenient for the crime committed. While a court is certainly at liberty to reject a sentence it considers inappropriate, if that decision is based on one version of the facts when several versions are likely to be presented to the jury, and if that decision is influenced by confusion over the applicable law, then the exercise of discretion is erroneous. Here, as the trial eventually demonstrated, and as the presentence report presaged, the facts supported jury instructions for murder, aggravated manslaughter, passion/provocation manslaughter, reckless manslaughter, and self-defense.
We note the trial court's initial decision to reject the plea was expressed after a lengthy exchange between the court and the victim's father. Naturally, a parent wants the most severe sanction for the person who killed his son. The views of the victim's family may be taken into consideration when considering a plea agreement, but the family's level of grief or degree of dissatisfaction with the plea cannot be controlling.
The court must evaluate the facts, both admitted and debated, apply those facts that can be established to the law, and then test the plea agreement against the facts, the law, and the range of permissible sentences under the Code. The court's experience with similar or analogous plea agreements should also be brought to bear in an effort to minimize sentencing disparity. In this instance we believe the proper analysis was not conducted.
The trial court's discretion to reject a plea, R. 3:9-2; R. 3:9-3(e), is indeed wide, but it cannot be unstructured and it is not limitless. Simply concluding that the interests of justice would not be served is insufficient if reasons are not provided that support such a conclusion or if the rationale is based on an incorrect legal analysis. We find the exercise of judicial discretion in this case plainly erroneous and manifestly a misuse of that discretion. The consequences to defendant are apparent.
A defendant may not be entitled to an offer of a plea bargain from the prosecutor, but when such an offer is made, accepted, and entered on the record, a defendant is entitled to a judicial assessment of that agreement grounded in a correct understanding of the law and the proper exercise of discretion. An error-free trial following the erroneous rejection of a plea agreement does not cure the pretrial error. Plaintiff's exposure to conviction and sentence for a greater offense than that which was bargained for then becomes a consequence of judicial error, not due process. Nor does the erroneous rejection of a plea agreement serve the legitimate"mutuality of advantage" a plea affords to both the defendant and the State. See State v. Taylor, 80 N.J. 353, 361 (1979). Proper functioning of" he system enables a defendant
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