 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Jeffries v. State5/14/2004
This appeal requires us to examine the distinction between two degrees of criminal homicide: manslaughter as defined in AS 11.41.120(a)(1), which requires proof of the defendant's recklessness; and second-degree murder as defined in AS 11.41.110(a)(2), which requires proof of a recklessness so heightened as to constitute "an extreme indifference to the value of human life".
In prior cases, we have upheld second-degree murder convictions for intoxicated drivers who killed other people. But in each of those instances, the defendant drove in ways that were manifestly extremely dangerous (even leaving aside the fact that the defendant's perceptions and reactions were impaired due to intoxication). In the present case, the defendant's physical acts of driving included only one reported lapse: he made a left turn directly in front of an oncoming car.
To prove Jeffries's "extreme indifference to the value of human life", the State relied heavily on evidence that Jeffries had numerous prior convictions for driving while intoxicated, that his license had been revoked for the previous ten years, that he had been drinking all day in violation of the conditions of his probation, and that he had previously refused several times to participate in court-ordered alcohol treatment programs. On appeal, Jeffries argues that this is an improper way to prove "extreme indifference". He asserts that extreme indifference must be proved solely by the quality of the defendant's conduct during the episode in question.
*187 Jeffries contends that his particular act of careless driving--the dangerous left turn--was not particularly egregious compared to the acts of careless driving that would typically lead to manslaughter convictions. Because Jeffries's physical conduct involved only a single dangerous left turn, he argues that he should have been convicted only of manslaughter.
For the reasons explained here, we conclude that Jeffries's suggested construction of the second-degree murder statute is too narrow. We have examined court decisions from jurisdictions that (like Alaska) have second-degree murder statutes derived from the Model Penal Code. We have also examined court decisions from jurisdictions that retain a common-law definition of murder--a definition that requires proof of "malice". Both of these groups of jurisdictions have upheld second-degree murder convictions in cases where the government's proof of extreme recklessness rested primarily on an intoxicated driver's persistent recidivism and failures at rehabilitation.
We, too, now hold that "extreme indifference to the value of human life" can be proved in this fashion. When a jury deliberates whether an intoxicated driver is guilty of second-degree murder or only manslaughter, the jury can lawfully consider the defendant's past convictions for driving while intoxicated, the defendant's refusals to honor license suspensions or abide by the conditions of probation in those prior DWI cases, and the defendant's past refusals to engage in alcohol treatment programs. We therefore affirm Jeffries's conviction for second-degree murder.
Underlying facts
On February 8, 2000, Michael V. Jeffries spent most of the day drinking. Viewing the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the State, Jeffries downed approximately twenty beers over the course of several hours. In the mid-afternoon, Jeffries and his long-time girlfriend, Beulah Dean, arrived at the Veterans of Foreign Wars club in Mountain View. They stayed there until approximately 8:00 p.m., with Jeffries continuing to drink beer. Jeffries and Dean then left the VFW to go home; Jeffries was driving.
Some fifteen minutes later, at the corner of DeBarr Road and Columbine Street, Jeffries made a left turn directly in front
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Alaska DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|