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Jeffries v. State5/14/2004
able equivalent of intentional murder.
...
In the present case, ... the testimony of the State's witnesses [showed] that the appellant was driving his vehicle in a reckless manner by weaving in his own lane; by swerving into the oncoming lane; by running off the surface of the road onto a low shoulder and attempting to return in an unsafe manner; or by engaging in a combination of any of the three. The prosecution also presented evidence ... that the appellant was legally intoxicated while driving his car in a reckless manner. Although it is a close question, we find that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could have concluded that the appellant's overall conduct was so grossly wanton that it manifested an extreme indifference to human life.
Allen, 611 So.2d at 1192-93.
The decision in Allen conforms to two earlier Alabama decisions, Patterson v. State, 518 So.2d 809 (Ala.Crim.App.1987), [FN28] and Slaughter v. State, 424 So.2d 1365 (Ala.Crim.App.1982).
FN28. Overruled on other grounds in Fore v. State, 858 So.2d 982, 990 (Ala.Crim.App.2003).
The defendant in Patterson had previously undergone alcohol abuse treatment, and he had been arrested for driving while intoxicated within the previous year. [FN29] During the twelve hours preceding the homicide, Patterson drank three bottles of wine; his blood alcohol level was .30 percent. [FN30] Patterson's car jumped the median of a divided road, crossed into the oncoming lanes, and struck two vehicles. [FN31] Under these facts, the court affirmed Patterson's conviction for extreme indifference murder. [FN32]
FN29. 518 So.2d at 816.
FN30. Id. at 811-12.
FN31. Id. at 810-11.
FN32. Id. at 816.
The defendant in Slaughter, who had been arrested at least four times previously for driving while intoxicated, spent the day drinking and then he went driving. [FN33] During the drive, Slaughter either passed out from intoxication or fell asleep; his car crossed the roadway, jumped the curb, and killed a woman who was working in her front yard. [FN34] On appeal, the Alabama court held that these facts were sufficient to establish extreme indifference murder. [FN35]
FN33. 424 So.2d at 1367.
FN34. Id. at 1366.
FN35. Id. at 1367.
Likewise, in State v. Schultz, 141 N.H. 101, 677 A.2d 675, 678 (1996), the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that "extreme indifference [murder] does not require proof of particularly vicious conduct. Rather, the critical factor is the degree to which the defendant disregards the risk of death to another."
We now turn to jurisdictions that retain the common-law definition of murder (i.e., those jurisdictions that define murder as a homicide committed with "malice"). As explained above, the common law recognized *193 extreme recklessness as a category of malice. And courts applying the common-law definition of murder have affirmed murder convictions for homicides committed by intoxicated drivers.
Many of these court decisions involved defendants who engaged in egregiously dangerous driving. [FN36] However, some of these "reckless murder" cases involved driving that one might typically expect of an intoxicated driver: impatiently attempting to pass a slower vehicle, inability to keep their vehicle traveling in a straight line, failing to see traffic signs and road markings, miscalculating distances, or misjudging the motion of other vehicles.
FN36. See, e.g., United States v. Fleming, 739 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1984); State v. Boone, 294 Or. 630, 661 P.2d 917, 920-22 (1983).
For instance, in Geter v. State, 219 Ga. 125, 132 S.E.2d 30 (1963), the court upheld the murder conviction of a defendant who, driving while intoxicated, attempted to pass the cars ahead of him on an uphill grade, at
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