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State v. Brown2/9/2004
rt should not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court in matters of admission or exclusion of evidence. State v. Finnerty (1998), 45 Ohio St.3d 104, 107. A trial court does not abuse its discretion unless it acts arbitrarily, unreasonably, or unconscionably. State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181, 191, 2002-Ohio-2128 at .
At the suppression hearing, the state failed to prove whether Deputy Paulus asked appellant if he used glasses or contact lenses before attempting the HGN test. The state was allowed to reopen the suppression hearing after it rested and present additional evidence. The only evidence presented was Deputy Paulus' testimony that he asked appellant "if he used glasses" and that he performed the HGN test "twice in each of [appellant's] eyes." In addition, we note that at the time the court reopened the evidence, the case had not been terminated, the court had not yet issued a judgment entry regarding appellant's motion to suppress, and the court had not yet issued a final judgment in the case. See State v. Callihan (1992), 80 Ohio App.3d 184, 195; Grant, 1 Ohio App.3d at 98.
The trial court's decision to reopen the suppression hearing was not arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable. Furthermore, appellant did not suffer any prejudice from the trial court's decision to reopen the suppression hearing. Deputy Paulus' testimony regarding whether he asked appellant if he used glasses and the number of times he performed the HGN test was inconsequential as the HGN test was ultimately suppressed. The first assignment of error is overruled.
Assignment of Error No. 2:
"THE COURT ERRED IN NOT SUPRESSING EVIDENCE."
Appellant asserts that when he made statements at the scene of the accident to Deputy Paulus, he was not free to leave and he was not given his Miranda warnings. Therefore, appellant maintains that he was in a custodial interrogation and the statements should have been suppressed.
Deputy Paulus testified that he arrived at the accident scene, he approached appellant and asked him if he was the driver of the vehicle. Upon appellant's affirmative reply, Deputy Paulus asked him for his driver's license. Deputy Paulus then asked him whether or not he had been drinking. Appellant admitted to drinking several alcoholic beverages that evening. Deputy Paulus testified that appellant was not free to leave at the time of the inquiry because "it was an accident scene."
A police officer's "questioning of the accused at the scene of an automobile accident only an attempt to elicit basic facts relative to the accident investigation." State v. Garland (1996), 116 Ohio App.3d 461, 470. A police officer is permitted to ask a detained motorist "a moderate number of questions to determine his identity and to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer's suspicions." Berkemer v. McCarty (1984), 468 U.S. 420, 439, 104 S.Ct. 3138.
Therefore, the roadside questioning of a detained motorist does not constitute a custodial interrogation for the purposes of the Miranda rule. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440, 104 S.Ct. at 3150; Pennsylvania v. Bruder (1988), 488 U.S. 9, 10-11, 109 S.Ct. 205. Consequently, "Miranda warnings not required at the time because the questioning constitute on-scene questioning done as part of the normal fact-finding process and not custodial interrogation." Garland, 116 Ohio App.3d at 470.
Thus, the trial court was correct in refusing to suppress appellant's statements to Deputy Paulus at the scene of the accident because the statements were not made during a custodial interrogation. The second assignment of error is overruled.
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