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Robinson v. Ellis6/21/2004
each plaintiff. Thus, to the extent that there was any error in the manner in which punitive damages were awarded or the damages were somehow inadequate based on the jury being allowed to use separate verdict forms for each plaintiff, such errors were induced by the Robinsons' counsel's actions, **428 and the Robinsons will not be heard to complain of the results here. Wallace v. Swift Spinning Mills, 236 Ga.App. 613, 617(2), 511 S.E.2d 904 (1999) ("It is a well-settled appellate rule that one cannot complain about a ruling of the trial court which the party's own trial tactics or conduct procured or aided in causing.") (citations and punctuation omitted).
2. The Robinsons argue that the trial court erred in (a) excluding evidence of Ellis's prior history of drinking while driving, and (b) allowing Ellis to testify to the fact that her husband had died nearly two years before the accident at issue and that her father was ill. We disagree.
The admission or exclusion of evidence, which has been objected to on relevancy grounds and relates to liability for punitive damages, is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. Langlois v. Wolford, 246 Ga.App. 209, 212(2), 539 S.E.2d 565 (2000).
(a) Although evidence of Ellis having prior DUI offenses in her record would have been admissible to show whether aggravating circumstances existed that would justify an award of punitive damages (see Langlois, supra, 246 Ga.App. at 213(2)(a), (b), 539 S.E.2d 565; see also Holt v. Grinnell, 212 Ga.App. 520, 521-522, 441 S.E.2d 874 (1994)), here there was no evidence that Ellis had any prior DUI offenses in her record. There was also no evidence that Ellis had previously consumed alcohol and driven while she was legally intoxicated as defined by law. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's exclusion of evidence relating to Ellis's prior alcohol consumption, as the prejudicial nature of such evidence outweighed its probative value at the second phase of the trial. Cf. *55 Webster v. Boyett, 269 Ga. 191, 195(1), 496 S.E.2d 459 (1998) (trial judge has discretion to exclude evidence of prior acts relevant to issue of punitive damages when probative value of such evidence is substantially outweighed by risk that its admission will mislead the jury, confuse the issue, or create substantial danger of undue prejudice).
(b) The Robinsons argue that Ellis's passing references to her status as a widow and her father's illness were irrelevant and prejudicial in that they evoked undue sympathy for Ellis at trial. However, the record reveals that the reference to Ellis's deceased husband was merely made as part of the background information about Ellis that was elicited on direct examination, and that the reference to Ellis's sick father was elicited by their counsel, not Ellis's counsel. Indeed, the references bore some relevance to Ellis's financial circumstances (i.e., absence of contributing income of her husband and having to take care of a sick relative), which is an entirely appropriate matter of inquiry in the punitive damages phase of trial. See, e.g., J.B. Hunt Transp. v. Bentley, 207 Ga.App. 250, 258(5), 427 S.E.2d 499 (1992). We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence.
Judgment affirmed.
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