Harris v. State1/7/2004
relevant for any other purpose. Any ability of the Checklist to predict future behavior must necessarily be based on its ability to indicate tendencies presently existing in the subject's personality — which in turn is based, in part, on an examination of the subject's past behavior.
Appellant's own experts — also relying in part on Appellant's past behavior — testified to support the defense theory that Appellant's mental functioning was impaired, and ultimately, that Appellant was (at least at the time of the crime) unable to form a specific intent to kill. In turn, the State was entitled to offer alternative explanations of Appellant's behavior. Appellant points out that psychopathy is not a recognized mental disorder. This, of course, is exactly why the State introduced the evidence in question: to show that Appellant's behavior was not the result of a diminished mental capacity, but rather the product of a generally violent personality for which he should be held accountable. We have repeatedly held that the State may present rebuttal evidence on mental-health issues raised by the defense. See Lockett v. State, 2002 OK CR 30, 22-25, 53 P.3d 418, 425; Van White v. State, 1999 OK CR 10, 52, 990 P.2d 253, 268-69; Maghe v. State, 1980 OK CR 100, 7, 620 P.2d 433, 435; see also 12 O.S.2001, § 2404(A)(1) (where accused presents evidence of a pertinent character trait, the prosecution may present evidence to rebut the same). Dr. Call's opinions, and prosecutor commentary on this evidence as bearing on Appellant's ability to form an intent to kill, were not improper.
Finally, we note that the jury was well aware of the limitations on Dr. Call's testimony. Dr. Call made it clear that while Appellant exhibited many behaviors associated with psychopathy, he also exhibited many behaviors inconsistent with psychopathy. Dr. Call admitted he could not conclusively state that Appellant was a psychopath, and conceded that even a psychopath may suffer from some other recognized mental illness. The trial court's limiting instruction, which Appellant did not object to, was patterned after the one used by the trial court in Lewis v. State, and we find it appropriate here as well. Proposition 2 is denied.
B. Domestic violence evidence
In the guilt stage of trial, the State presented evidence that Appellant had physically and verbally abused his wife for years. In Proposition 4, Appellant claims that this evidence was irrelevant to the issues in the case and should not have been admitted. We disagree. Evidence of other wrongs, crimes, or bad acts committed by the accused may be relevant to such issues as motive and intent. 12 O.S.2001, § 2404; Burks v. State, 1979 OK CR 10, 2, 594 P.2d 771, 772, modified on other grounds, Jones v. State, 1989 OK CR 7, 8, 772 P.2d 922, 925. We have often held that in marital homicide cases, prior acts of abuse committed by the accused against the victim may be relevant to the issue of intent. See e.g. Smith v. State, 1996 OK CR 50, 20, 932 P.2d 521, 530, cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1124, 117 S.Ct. 2522, 138 L.Ed.2d 1023 (1997); Cheney v. State, 1995 OK CR 72, 49 & n.54, 909 P.2d 74, 87 & n.54; Hooker v. State, 1994 OK CR 75, 25, 887 P.2d 1351, 1359, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 858, 116 S.Ct. 164, 133 L.Ed.2d 106 (1995). The fact that the last injuries Appellant inflicted upon his wife were not fatal does not render evidence of his prior abusive conduct any less relevant to his intentions. The only dispute in the guilt phase of trial was Appellant's intent. Evidence of Appellant's prior threats and physical abuse toward his wife was relevant to show that his threats to kill Mrs. Harris, her family, and Merle Taylor, made shortly before th
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